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IDENTITY OF PARTIES 
Appellants: Jennifer Chapman (minor) 
Teresa Chapman 
Robert Chapman. 
Respondents: PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a hospital 
organized to do business in the State of Utah; 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER, a hospital 
organized to do business in the State of Utah; 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, a Utah corporation 
dba PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah corporation dba 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; 
THE HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS. 
By order entered April 1, 1986, The District Court 
redesignated the name of all of the above 
Respondents as "I. H. C. Hospitals, Inc., a Utah 
Corporation dba Primary Children's Medical Center," 
(R. at 283, infra at A-2.) 
GARTH MEYERS, M. D.; 
L. GEORGE VEASY, M. D., KAREN BOWMAN, R. N. 
OTHER PARTY DEFENDANTS NOT INVOLVED IN THIS APPEAL 
SCOTT WETZEL COMPANY, A Utah corporation; 
THE HOME GROUP, INC., a foreign corporation; 
JOHN DOE I-X; and 
BLACK CORPORATIONS I-V. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is the medical malpractice statute of limitations Utah Code 
Ann. §78-14-4, tolled during a continuing fiduciary relationship 
between a patient and a health care provider. 
2. Was it error for the trial court to grant summary judgment 
based upon the medical malpractice statute of limitations where 
there was a material issue of fact as to whether the plaintiffs-
appellants (hereinafter sometimes "plaintiffs") were aware of the 
plaintiffs1 "legal injury" within the period of the statute of limitations. 
3. Was it error for the trial court to grant summary judgment 
where there was evidence that the defendants-appellees (hereinafter 
sometimes "defendants") concealed and misrepresented the cause of 
plaintiffs injuries and where, by reason of such conduct, the plaintiffs 
claimed that the defendants were estopped from utilizing the statute 
of limitations as a defense. 
4. Does the Utah medical malpractice statute of limitations 
U.C.A. §78-14-4 violate equal protection and due process provisions 
of the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. 
5. Does the Utah medical malpractice statute of limitations 
U.C.A. §78-14-4 unconstitutionally deprive minor plaintiffs of access 
to the courts in violation of the Utah Constitution and the Constitution 
of the United States. 
6. Was it reversible error for the trial court to deny all 
discovery rights to the plaintiffs prior to the summary judgment 
hearing and decision. 
7. Was it reversible error for the trial court to grant 
defendant's motions for summary judgment when it was alleged that 
care giving rise to the plaintiffs claims had been rendered within the 
period of the statute of limitations. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASti 
Appellants seek review of a ruling from the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, Judge Wilkinson presiding, which 
granted Appellees' motions for summary judgment and motions to 
dismiss based upon the statute of limitations in a medical 
malpractice action. (R. at 282-284, infra at A-2 through A-3) The 
presentation of arguments herein has been made considerably more 
difficult since the Court's order granting summary judgment did not 
make any specific rulings with respect to the nuanv issues raised in 
this complex case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Jennifer Chapman, (hereinafter sometimes 
"plaintiff) claims that she suffers from permanent and irreversible 
brain damage due to the negligence of the Defendants Primary 
Children's Hospital, Primary Children's Medical Center, Intermountain 
Health Care, IHC Hospitals, Inc., and The Health Services Corporation 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (hereinafter 
sometimes collectively the "Hospital"). It is further claimed that she 
received substandard care thereafter from Drs. Veasy and Meyers 
(hereinafter sometimes the "Defendant Physicians") and the Hospital, 
who continued to provide what is alleged to be substandard medical 
care for Jennifer for several years after she received her brain 
injury. Plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants falsely 
misrepresented the cause of Jennifer's brain damage to them. 
Plaintiffs submitted interrogatories to defendants and noticed 
the depositions of some of the defendants and their employees prior 
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to the Court's hearing upon the defendants motions, but the Court 
entered an order staying all of the plaintiffs1 discovery and granted 
the motions of defendants for summary judgment before any 
discovery could be conducted. The following facts, are therefore 
gleaned from the affidavits of Jennifer Chapman's parents, Teresa 
and Robert Chapman which were filed in opposition to defendant's 
motions below. (R. 140-151, infra. A-5 through A-16) 
Jennifer Chapman is now 13 years old and is severely brain 
damaged. She is permanently disabled, completely incompetent and 
wholly dependent upon others for all of her bodily functions. 
During the first five months of her life, Jennifer experienced 
several "blue spells" for which she was taken to a hospital in Ogden, 
Utah for treatment. The doctors who had been treating her in Ogden 
then sent her to Dr. Veasy at the Primary Children's Hospital for 
specialized care. He diagnosed the illness as a heart problem which 
he attempted to stabilize with medication until an operation could be 
performed. An operation was subsequently performed to install a 
device called a Waterston shunt. The first shunt did not function 
properly and on February 28, 1973, a second operation was 
performed to alter the shunt. After surgery Jennifer recovered from 
the anesthesia and her family was permitted to visit with her. They 
observed that she was crying and awake, spent some time with her 
and left the room. After 10 to 15 minutes had passed, her mother 
returned to visit her again and found that a heart monitor machine 
attached to Jennifer had gone off and was sounding an alarm. The 
nurses in attendance told Mrs. Chapman that the alarm was caused 
by difficulties with the machine. Mrs. Chapman accepted this 
4 
L ' A p L l l U t i i H I i . i l l I i l n ,1 l i l l l i r , " i . | | | i l h , ' I m « m l mi i i L i i i l l I n ] I I ) 
mi;iu;cs bc!^'v- i! irses noticed that Jennifer was having a 
-iMM- JH arrest. Emergencv r^suscitative measures saved Jennifer's 
* damaged. 
Thereafter, Jennifer's parents asked u*c defendants about the 
caust ui Jennifer's brain dama The-
defendants were still acting a- physicians ' Jennifer and while a 
(fiduciary) physician-health care provider/patient relationship 
existed, Dunn * • mod, a ir.l.ilum.'tlup i»l anisiderablr IIIIMI 
existed between Chapmans and the defendants. The Chapmans 
were told defendants that there were hospital records and tests 
I l l i l l In i i i i i i 11 I " I in ml n i l i c s s\ i 11. I In in HI i in I i l i i 11 i l l i t s in i n I 
that ::*• h i- - damage was unavoidable and could nol he due fo the 
negligence of anyone. Based i ip- :)ri these statements, Jennifer's 
pai ents belie\ eci tl lat 1 lei Injuries were in fact caused b\ Mum I clots, 
and were unavoidable. Furthermore, nothing wa* sau* the 
Chapmans which woi ll :i indicate • that th . se 
Chapman that the heart monitor alarm, "was caused by difficulties 
with the machine were untrue1. 
n *vas ii * against the Ogdui 
doctors who had treated Jennifer >M -.;• MI: v.p..- > she had 
experienced during the first fne months o( her life The Chapmans 
claimed thai the ()v(L-% - l .• iinl too Inn ,^ to ~,cnd 
Jennifer to Dr. Veasy lor specialized *\ir • 
J 1 he trial court was advised that plaintiffs needed further 
discovery to determine if these statements were false, but no such 
permission was granted CR at 155. m 196 ^67 ?Rm 
The Chapmans consulted with Defendant Veasy for his 
professional opinion as to whether the Ogden doctors had been 
negligent in failing to send Jennifer to him sooner. Dr. Veasy 
persuaded the plaintiffs that there had been no negligence on the 
part of the Ogden doctors, that Jennifer's brain damage was due to 
blood clots, and that it was unavoidable and unrelated to anyone's 
misconduct. Dr. Veasy recommended dismissal of the suit and 
Plaintiffs, in reliance of Dr. Veasy's statements to them, dismissed the 
suit against the Ogden physicians. 
After the dismissal of the Ogden case, the defendants continued 
to provide treatment to Jennifer Chapman and continued to 
represent to her parents that the medical records and tests showed 
that the cause of the injuries was blood clots and that Jennifer's brain 
damage was unavoidable. The Chapmans trusted and believed the 
defendants until the summer of 1984, when they for the first time 
were given the medical records which related to Jennifer's injuries. 
Contrary to the statements of the defendants, the medical records did 
not contain any test results which would indicate the true cause of 
the injuries and the records showed uncertainty as to the cause of 
the injuries. These records were therefore in direct conflict with the 
statements of Dr. Veasy who had continually represented to the 
Chapmans that all indications from tests and records showed that the 
injuries were the result of blood clots, that he "knew for a fact" that 
the blood clots had caused her injury, that this event was 
unavoidable and could have nothing to do with any negligence on the 
part of anyone. The Chapmans confronted Dr. Veasy with the 
hospital records and say, at this point, that he admitted that the 
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hlooil f loh IIIIIIM ' in niih .in a1 unipinnii n In, part and thai no 
tests had been performed which corroborated this assumption. The 
Chapmans then immediately souplif lei?al n h i c c ami a ninlirail 
opinion concerning the care provided by fli1 defendants. In January 
of 1985, the Chapmans discovered that in the opinion of a consulting 
physic !*i in, I I in i MI in ill in i I I n in in In1* mi in [in in i * OIL lh ' mi negligence nf 
the Hospital's nurses who had failed lo recognize Jennifer's critical 
condition and thai I he brain injuries she1 sustained were due to a lack 
I iMe,en, in ml hi II ill I il as llic had 1 t in pn unus!) lold Plaintiffs 
thereafter filed a claim pursuant lo flu applicable Utah statutes and 
this lawsuit followed. 
1 defendants claimed that Jennifer's father, Robeil I hapman, was 
aware of tlieii possible negligence as eaill) as 1973 and provided a 
lettei frorii Mi ("liipnniii k I hi \ n\\ in nul n,f annate III n ILiinii i lh 
65-72, infra. A 1 / through A-24) However, when this letter was 
written flu Chapmans believed the Ogden physicians to have been at 
hull I H (i I i I I mi in il u lh mi I in in n hi (i Mi \ < J1 ill in u hi i 1 inn I In 
letter referred lo what the Chapmans believed to be tin: negligent 
acts oi the Ogden physician^ nut the defendants in tins case'* • as 
ini|ilit'il Ii mi IiL (liiieriilanil > in ill in argument Ai Ifie time flu1, letter 
was written, the Chapmans had linen persuaded li\ l)r Veasy lhat 
Jennifer's injuries were due to blond d o t s and weie iifia\ nidable Mi 
Veas\ (lien »ei about convincing llln Chapmans that they should drop 
their claim against the Ogden physicians This effort was successful 
and lh > I i Jiu < JIuiJiLiuJ , Jisinisscd MelenJanL in ., lake (lie 
1
 See Robert Chapman Affida\it Paragraph * CR nt 142, infra. A-/) 
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somewhat inconsistent position that Jennifer's "legal injury" was 
obvious all along. 
Defendants sought summary judgment, claiming that the Utah 
Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations barred the medical 
malpractice claims asserted by plaintiffs. In the Lower Court the 
defendants did not address the question of their negligence and 
limited their motion solely to the statute of limitations. Furthermore, 
defendants focused upon a single act of negligence which occurred in 
February, 1973. No mention was made by the defendants or the trial 
court in its order dismissing the case of the fact that the plaintiffs 
claimed that the defendants' negligence in the care of Jennifer 
Chapman was ongoing, at least until March or April, 1985. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court below granted summary judgment when there were 
material questions of fact on the question of whether the statute of 
limitations had run in this case. The trial court completely foreclosed 
discovery over the objections of plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the 
inability of plaintiffs to obtain crucial information, they 
demonstrated by affidavits that there were material questions as to 
whether the defendants had hidden information from them and 
whether false information had been given to them concerning the 
cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 
These questions of fact created genuine legal issues as to 
whether the plaintiffs knew of the "legal cause" of the plaintiffs 
injuries at a time which would have caused the statute of limitations 
8 
were estoppec . * inin^ of the statu1. * limitations u^  , 
defense. i addition, < ri granted ^*rr. :dement 
I lie ./•...>.!••. • - ::. . - / "s . •:. *...-: *... * :.-v-n 
this issue was properly pled and placed into issue by plaintiffs. The 
trial court ihni iijantnl > iiinin.ii r iiulyinrnl upon lln: i|iu\s(inn if 
whether care provided 1:>) the defendants within the period of the 
statute of imitations was negligently done. l'his judgment was 
gra ii' he f a : i • : f th z • i n n efuted alleg.ilnui 111 .it tl le • defend ai its 
care was ongoing after the initial .;: negligence (at lea st until 
early 1985) and that the ongoing care was negligently rendered. 
I Jndei siiel i circumstances the plaintiffs were erititled to have a jury 
decide the question of whether the continuing care given bj the 
defendants w as si, ibstandai d and vhethe i: inji ir> resulted fi in i it 
: : s lamtiffs next contend : ah Medical Malpractice 
Statute < >f limitations is unconstitutional ' I his statu ite denies minors 
like hapmai i the eqi lal pi otecti ::>ri ::: f tl le • la w s, • ::ii le pi c • :ess 
and access to the courts. This court has held that statutes which 
deny minors the equal protection * ^ r access 
naipraci .t statute 
limitations attempts i j i . unconstitutional. 
This court should reverse the summary judgmen behalf * 
defendants ciiteied l»y hidjic. Wilkinson below, and Order that ,*-.. 
matter proceed to trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY § 78-14-4 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS). 
In this case, as in others where the statute of limitations may 
be applicable as an affirmative defense, the courts have placed a 
heavy burden on the party asserting the defense. In such cases, 
"(T)he party pleading the statute of limitations has the burden of 
proving that the action is barred...." Garland v. True Temper 
Corporation. 354 F.Supp. 328, 330 (D.C.W.Va.1973). See Also, Ray v. 
Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co.. dl70 Okl. 414, 40 P.2d 663 (1935); 
Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Meldrim. 195 Ga. 765, 25 S.E.2d 567 
(1943); Wahl v. Cunningham 320 Mo. 57, 6 S.W.2d 576 (1928). 
Similarly, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (c) makes the statute of 
limitations an affirmative defense. 
Furthermore, since the defendants seek summary judgment, all 
facts and the inferences to be drawn from them must be given the 
interpretation most favorable to the plaintiffs. Therefore, the facts 
set forth in the plaintiffs' statement of facts (supra) must, for 
purposes of the motions in question here be taken as true since they 
are supported by the affidavits of Robert and Teresa Chapman and 
are not conclusively refuted by any evidence submitted by the 
defendants. Utilizing these facts the plaintiffs submitted to the trial 
court3 a list of both the undisputed facts and the disputed facts 
3
 See P. 7 and 8 of plaintiffs1 memorandum in opposition to 
defendants' motions for summary judgment (R. at 158-159) 
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which were gleaned from,, the record, before the ti ial court, ' rhey 
follow: 
Undisputed facts; 
1 , For the first five months of her life, Jennifer Chapman 
experienced several blue spells for which she was taken to a 
hospital in Ogden, Utah for treatment. 
2 When Jennifer was approximately five months old, the 
doctors who had been treating her in Ogden sent her to Dr. 
Veasy at the Primary Children's Hospital for specialized care. 
3 Dr V easy examined Jennifer and diagnosed the illness 
i heart problem which he attempted to stabilize with 
medications until an operation could be performed. An 
operation to install a device called a (iA ' aterston shunt was 
subsequently performed. The first device did not function 
properly and on February 28, 1973, a second operation was 
performed to alter the shunt. 
1. Jennifer suffered severe and permanently ...cabling 
brain injuries while she w "as in the recovery room after the 
second operation. j 
5. Since February 28, 1973, the Chapmans ai id Jennifer 
maintained a continuing doctor-patient relationship with Dr. 
Veasy and the Hospital which lasted until approximately March 
or April 1985. A doctor-patient relationship between the 
Chapmans arid, Jennifer existed with Di Meyers until 
approximately June, 1983 During these periods Jennifer 
received treatment for her brain damaged condition and its 
complications from these defendants. 
11 
Disputed facts4: 
1. Whether the defendants named herein told the 
Chapmans that there were hospital records and tests which 
showed that Jennifer's injuries were due to blood clots and that 
her brain damage was unavoidable and could not be due to the 
negligence of anyone and whether anything was said to the 
Chapmans which would indicate that the nurses statements to 
Mrs. Chapman that the heart monitor alarm was caused by 
difficulties with the machine were untrue. 
2. Whether the Chapmans relied on the assurances of the 
defendants and believed that there were tests and records of 
the Hospital which showed that Jennifer's injuries were in fact 
caused by blood clots, were unavoidable, and could not have 
been caused by any misconduct of the hospital employees or 
referring physicians and whether they believed Dr. VeasyV 
assurances to be true. 
3. Whether prior to July, 1984 the Chapmans believed 
the explanations of defendants as to the cause of Jennifer's 
injuries and whether at or about that time Dr. Veasy changed 
or altered his statements to the Chapmans on that subject. 
4. Whether prior to January, 1985 the Chapmans had no 
medical evidence that the actual cause of Jennifer's injuries 
was due to the negligence of the Hospital's employees and was 
caused by a lack of oxygen and not blood clots as they had 
previously been told by the defendants. 
4
 Plaintiff pointed out to the trial court that many of these facts 
have not been mentioned by defendants in their affidavits. Plaintiff 
therefore observed the these facts must be deemed to be 
uncontroverted for purposes of the motions and that the facts were 
placed under the heading of "disputed facts" since Dr. Veasyfs 
affidavit maked the unsubstantiated assumption that ".. I know and 
state that continuously since 1973 they (the Chapmans) have 
believed ... that the episode ... in February 1973 was preventable and 
resulted from medical negligence by those who attended her." (Veasy 
affidavit P. 3. (R. at 159, R. at 108) 
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A. I I I E STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS TOLLED DURING A L U N i'lNUING 
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN. 
li is well established in ( Jtal i tl lat the statute of lin litatioi is foi 
a medical malpractice action does not begin to run \ intil the 
physician-patient relationship between the physician • : K- *i -
provider anil Ihr p.idrnt lu-i In i mil Inniiiiit Petcici Kobism 
P.2d 244, 248 (Utah 1932). Undei I Jtah law the existence of the 
continuing physician-patient fiduciary relationship tolls tlle statute 
lonship is 
terminated. Peteler at 248. Utah's rule tolling the statute of 
limitations during the existence of" this fiduciary relationship is ii i 
Line ,< ith 1:1 le majority • jurisdictions which hold tl lat the statute of 
limitations does not -->CI;MI to iiim until I he physician-patient 
relationship 'teriiilriat.es o, i AiiLJlLL -"l 1"hy sicians a.nd Surgeons 
§185 p..M2, Schmit v. Essen 183 Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931); 
Hotelling v. Walther. 169 Or. 559, 130 P2d 944 (1942); Grazor v. 
Lh bin.... i i e , V l'« Ealy v. 
Sheppeck. 100 N.M.250, 669 P.2d 259 (1983); Sanchez v. South 
Hoover Hospital. 132 Cal.Rptr. 657, 553 P,2cl 1129 (1976). 
'Ih',1 .Supreme (/'oiii!' MI Washington ulsu lullowed this i ule m 
Samuelson v. Freeman. 454 P.2d 406 (Wash. 1969)5. That Court 
summarized its holding as follows: 
"In construing the statute " limitations concerning 
medical malpractice, we think it .: : rule that, if 
5
 Washington's Supreme Court has restated this rule in the 
subsequent case of Bixler v. Bowman. 94 Wash.2d 146, 614 P.2d 
1290 (1980) 
malpractice is claimed during a continuous and substantially 
uninterrupted course of treatment for that particular illness or 
condition, the statute does not begin to run until the treatment 
for that particular illness or condition has been terminated." 
(citations omitted) Id. at 410. 
Since it was uncontested that the defendants and the Chapmans 
maintained physician-patient relationships with Dr. Veasy and the 
Hospital until March or April, 19856 this fact should have been 
dispositive below since the statute of limitations under such 
circumstances would not begin to run until March or April, 1985, and 
since this case was filed well within the period of the statute of 
limitations. 
B. THE DEFENDANTS MISREPRESENTED THE CAUSE OF THE 
PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES AND THE PLAINTIFF'S FAMILY DID NOT 
KNOW OF JENNIFER CHAPMAN'S "LEGAL INJURY" UNTIL JULY OF 
1984 AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT COMMENCE 
RUNNING UNTIL THAT TIME. 
The defendants relied principally on Section 78-14-4(l)(b) in 
their attempt to establish that the statute of limitations had run. A 
portion of that statute provides: 
In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been 
prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health 
care provider because that health care provider has 
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged 
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within 
one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs, (emphasis 
ours) (The "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act" is reproduced as 
6
 Robert Chapman affidavit, paragraph 10. (R. at 144, infra at A-9) 
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A-25 through supplements reproduced i° A riA 
through A-41) 
In Foil v. Ballinger. this Court held that the statute of 
limitations • medical malpra^v; actions begin* lo run v\ 
i i - Know . ms suffered * egal 
injury." This Court held that a person •..* usoovered his "legal 
injuiv wiicii * ll i .il In I I Nil si a i in. il 
an injury *mc ^ia. .i
 t . • A(U> caused by negligent action." 
(emphasis ours) Id * •* n ^ federal District Court has followed 
L' :... u-H,u * «...i...:i8t """L)S I' 'Vipp, IV |IM H|;ih 1%'H 
in which the Court held: 
"Under Foil, and its progeny, a legal 
determination of negligence is not necessary 
to start the statute of limitations. Rather, the 
crucial question is whether the plaintiff was 
aware of the facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that he may 
have a cause of action against the health care 
provider." (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original) H . at 155. 
This Court's statement in Foil seems appropriate here: 
"[Wjhen injuries arc suffered that have been 
caused by an unknown act of negligence by 
an expert, the law ought not to be construed 
I destroy a right of action before a person 
even becomes aware of the existence of that 
right." L l at 14 7 
Under the rule of these cases, Chapmans : J not discover 
• • • * - • ' " '
V i
 '
 > u f y 
tcrmiier Februar 1973, rne plaintiffs had been told by the 
defendants that the injuries were 
unavoidable injury which was *u**-v ,c >^x.> - :< Jhapmans, 
tantamount to an act of God. They were further falsely told that the 
hospital records and "tests" confirmed these facts, and that Dr. Veasy 
"knew for a fact" that the blood clots had caused her injury. 
Throughout the period in which these assurances were made, the 
defendants had a physician-patient relationship with the Chapmans 
and Jennifer and had a fiduciary duty to them. Under such 
circumstances they had an affirmative fiduciary duty to advise their 
patients of the complete truth and all of the facts surrounding 
Jennifer's injury. When the defendants' fiduciary duties demanded 
that they convey all of the facts and any uncertainties which they 
may have had, the Chapmans were given false information or 
information which was calculated to conceal the true cause of the 
injuries. 
In the court below the defendants argued that if the Chapmans 
"discovered" the injury prior to 1984 they couldn't have been 
"prevented" from "discovering" it by the defendants. The defendants 
claimed that a letter written to Defendant Veasy by Robert Chapman 
evidenced the plaintiffs' discovery of the "legal injury" in 1973. The 
affidavit of plaintiff Robert Chapman demonstrates the fallacy of 
defendants' argument7. Mr. Chapman's letter must be viewed in 
correct context and not as presented by the defendants. At the time 
of the letter, the Chapmans had been consulting with Dr. Veasy to 
obtain his professional opinion as to whether there was negligence on 
the part of the doctors from Ogden who treated Jennifer. The 
Chapmans wanted to know if these doctors were negligent for failing 
to send Jennifer for care to Dr. Veasy sooner, and whether if she 
7
 Robert Chapman affidavit Paragraph 5. (R. at 142, infra at A-7) 
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were sent earlier, surgery could have been avoided. Mr. Chapman's 
statement in his letter that he thought that the ftegligence was 
"obvious", refers to the delay of the Ogden doctors in sending 
Jennifer to Dr. Veasy because they thought that earlier treatment by 
Dr. Veasy might have lessened or avoided Jennifer's problems. A 
lawsuit was then pending or about to be pending against the Ogden 
doctors, but no defendant in this suit was name4 in that suit. Indeed, 
the Chapmans were persuaded by defendants that Jennifer's brain 
damage was due to an unavoidable act of God, and they had no 
intention of suing these defendants. In summary, the letter from Mr. 
Chapman to Dr. Veasy has nothing at all to do with this case or of the 
discovery by the Chapmans of a cause of action against the 
defendants herein. 
The plaintiffs had a right to rely on the expertise and advice of 
the defendants named herein, particularly when they had a fiduciary 
duty to keep them fully informed and to protect them from further 
injury. These defendants should not now be permitted to complain 
that the plaintiffs should not have believed theii or that they had no 
right to rely upon their statements. 
The foregoing discussion discloses that there were geniune 
issues before the trial court as to when the plaintiffs "discovered" the 
existence of the "legal injury" and the availability of a cause of action 
and whether they were prevented from discovering these facts by 
the defendants. Thus it was error for the trial pourt to grant 
summary judgment on this issue. 
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C. THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS 
ARE ESTOPPED FROM PLEADING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
If it is true that the defendants misrepresented or conspired to 
misrepresent the true cause of the injuries suffered by Jennifer 
Chapman, it then follows that there was a wrongful attempt to 
conceal evidence which would indicate the true cause of Jennifer's 
injuries. Under such circumstances, a defendant is estopped- from 
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. 
Utah follows the majority of jurisdictions and this Court has 
found that a defendant is estopped from pleading the statute of 
limitations where the defendant has concealed the existence of 
material facts which would put the plaintiff on notice of the cause of 
action. In Rice v. Granite School District. 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969) it 
was held that the defendant could not raise the statute of limitations 
as a defense where the plaintiffs delay in filing the suit was induced 
by the defendant. This Court held: 
"One cannot justly or equitably lull an 
adversary into a false sense of security 
thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of 
limitations, and then be heard to plead that 
very delay as a defense to the action when 
brought. " (citations omitted) Id., at 163. 
Several courts have held that defendants are estopped from 
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense where there is a 
fiduciary relationship and a failure to disclose material information. 
These courts have specifically considered the relationship between 
physicians and their patients in terms of the effect it has on the 
estoppel issue. For example, the California Supreme Court has ruled 
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that a defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations 
as a defense where he conceals material information about the 
nature of or the cause of the plaintiffs injuries ^nd, as a result, the 
plaintiff files suit after the statute of limitations has run. Bowman v. 
McPheeters.176 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1947); Stafford y.Shultz. 270 P.2d 1 
(Cal. 1954). Furthermore, it is widely held that the statute of 
limitations is tolled by fraudulent or untruthful representation by a 
physician as to the cause of a particular problem, Emmett v. Easter 
Dispensary & Casualty Hospital,. 130 App. D.C. 50, 396 F.2d 931 (D. C. 
Cir. 1967); Rodriguez v. Monoil. 9 Ariz. App. 2^5, 450 P2d 737 
(1969); Proctor v. Schombert 63 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1953); Groedal v. 
Westrate. 171 Mich. 92, 137 N.W. 87; Lakeman v. La France. 102 N.H. 
300, 156 A2d 123 (1960). 
There was, at the very least, a factual dispute as to whether the 
defendants, who had fiduciary duties to the Chftpmans, had 
misrepresented or concealed facts in this case. &[f they did, they are 
estopped from pleading the statute of limitation^. The dispute over 
this material issue made the granting of summary judgment by the 
trial court inappropriate. 
D. THE CLAIMED NEGLIGENT CARE OF THE PLAINTIFF BY 
DEFENDANTS WAS ONGOING AND WITHIN THE PERIOD OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
No mention was made by the trial court of the fact that the 
plaintiffs claimed that after Jennifer Chapman was injured, the 
defendants continued to provide substandard care to her and that 
this resulted in damage to her. By granting summary judgment the 
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trial court completely eliminated this important question of fact, 
presumably ruling that as a matter or law, no substandard care was 
rendered to Jennifer during the period within the statute of 
limitations. The trial court's ruling was made in the face of affidavits 
from Robert and Teresa Chapman that the defendants provided care 
to Jennifer until early 1985, well within the period of the statute of 
limitations8. It was patently unfair to the plaintiffs to deny them the 
right even to obtain the defendants' records concerning the care 
given to Jennifer (by foreclosing all discovery) and then to rule 
without the benefit of affidavits or other evidence that the ongoing 
care given to her was not substandard. 
n. PLAINTIFFS PLED FRAUD WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY TO 
SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 9(B) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The plaintiffs asserted claims for torts related to the 
defendants' misconduct in concealing evidence and in violating their 
fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs. These torts included intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, outrage, attempt to deprive the 
plaintiffs of their causes of action9, fraud and fraudulent 
concealment. In the court below the defendants chose to ignore 
these claims in their motion and singled out plaintiffs' allegations of 
8 Affidavit of Robert Chapman (R. 140-145, infra A-5 through A-10); 
Affidavit of Teresa Chapman (R. 146-151, infra A-11 through A-16) 
9
 See Smith v. Los Angeles 198 Cal Rptr 829 (1984) in which the 
court recognized that it was actionable to spoil or destroy evidence 
where it significantly prejudiced the plaintiffs case. 
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fraudulent concealment10. The defendants claimed that plaintiffs' 
cause of action for this tort was not pled with Enough particularity to 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Defendants contended that plaintiffs' cause of action in 
fraud should be dismissed because the plaintiffs were not able to 
itemize each act of fraud and/or conspiracy to defraud the plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs pointed out to no avail that they had been denied all 
discovery and that the defendants' Rule 9(b) motion did not seek to 
dispose of the other claims mentioned above which were being 
asserted by plaintiffs. 
Rule 9(b) should not and has not been so strictly interpreted by 
the courts. Rule 9(b) merely requires that the "circumstances 
constituting fraud of mistake shall be stated with particularity." This 
requirement of the Rule has been met by the plaintiffs in their 
complaint. These circumstances of fraud are stated with sufficient 
"particularity" by the plaintiffs in their complaint. All that is 
required is that the elements of fraudulent concealment be pleaded 
by plaintiffs. In this regard, the plaintiffs alleged that they had 
relied on the assurances of the defendants who had continually told 
them that the injuries were not the result of anV negligence on the 
part of these defendants. The plaintiffs have also pled the incidences 
10
 Utah has recognized that a a cause of action may lie for 
fraudulent concealment. In Elder v. Clawson. 384 P.2d. 802 (Utah 
1963), the Utah Supreme court spoke to this claim: "The principle is 
basic in the law of fraud as it relates to nondisclosure that a charge 
of fraud is maintainable where a party who knows material facts is 
under a duty, under the circumstances, to speakj and disclose this 
information, but remains silent..."(citations omitted) 
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when the named defendants used fraudulent means to conceal the 
true cause of the injuries. Nothing more is required than a pleading 
of adequate notice of these claims by a setting forth of the elements 
of these claims and it was error for the trial court to grant summary 
judgment on this issue11. 
III. THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
A. HISTORY: 
Prior to 1976, the statute of limitations applicable to minors in 
medical malpractice actions was tolled during the child's minority 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1953). In 1976, the 
Legislature passed the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Section 78-
14-4 of that Act purported to "apply to all persons regardless of 
minority or other legal disability." The following year, this Court 
rendered its decision in Scott v. School Board of Granite School 
District. 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), which held that "a minor claimant 
is justly entitled to the protection afforded by § 78-12-36(1), ... in all 
cases... to hold otherwise is a denial of due process and equal 
protection." fid, at 748 (emphasis added)]. 
In 1979, the Legislature made a minor amendment to § 78-14-
4 in direct response to this Court's holding in Scott v. School Board. 
As amended, the statute reads in pertinent part: "The provisions of 
11 This should be particularly true where as here leave to amend 
plaintiffs complaint was requested so as to permit plaintiffs to 
formally incorporate into their complaint those factual averments 
made in their memorandum in opposition to defendants motion for 
summary judgment. (R. at 168) 
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this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other 
legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law..." 
B. THE MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DENIES EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.| 
The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions is 
unconstitutional as applied to minors. The Utah Supreme Court so 
held by necessary implication in Scott v. School Board of Granite 
School District. 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), when it held that the 
tolling provision in U.C.A. § 78-12-36, applied in favor of minors in 
all cases. 
In any event, the medical malpractice statute of limitations 
denies minor plaintiffs equal protection under any substantive 
standard of review. There was and is no factual predicate to justify 
elimination of minors' rights, and there is no evidence that the 
statute has or will have any tendency to further the legislative 
purposes of Utah's Health Care Malpractice Act. The statute also 
denies minor claimants' constitutionally protected right of access to 
the courts by eliminating minors' causes of action before they ever 
legally have a chance to assert them. This is especially true in cases 
such as this where the minor claimant not only suffers from the 
disability of minority but is wholly incompetent as well. 
In Scon v. School Board of Granite School District. 568 P.2d 746 
(Utah 1977), the Supreme Court of Utah was presented with the 
question of whether a minor plaintiff should be barred from suing a 
school district for failure to comply with the notice provision in 
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. U.C.A.. § 63-30-13 (1953, as 
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amended). The specific issue in Scott v. School Board was whether 
the limitation period (barring a claim unless notice was filed within 
90 days of the occurrence) took precedence over the general tolling 
provision in U.C.A.. §78-12-36(1), which provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
Effect of Disability. — If a person entitled 
to bring an action ... is at the time the cause 
of action accrued... 
1. Under the age of majority ... 
The time of such disability is not part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
Scott vT SphQQl Bpfrrd holds: 
[A] minor claimant is justly entitled to the 
protection afforded by said §78-12-36(1)... 
in all cases including notice requirements 
of all the type contained in the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. To hold 
otherwise is a denial of due process and 
egytal protection, 
The Court's rationale for protecting the rights of minors demonstrates 
that its holding is not limited to the facts in Scott, but applies to 
minors "in all cases." The court stated: 
A minor is incapable of giving notice by the 
very virtue of his minority, nor may he 
bring an action in his own behalf while a 
minor. He simply has no standing by 
statute, 1TJ.C A. § 15-2-1,] and an action by 
or against a minor requires the appointment 
of a guardian ad litem. 
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The parents, or natural guardians, have no 
specific legal duty to perform and h^ve no 
responsibility to their natural off-spring 
other than their moral obligation. 
Consequently, in matters of this kincj, when 
a parent or natural guardian fails fof one 
reason or another to give notice, file suit, 
or otherwise protect the minor's legil 
interest, the minor is left completely 
without a remedy. [LL at 747-48]. 
Scott v. School Board expressly reversed Gallegos v. Midvale 
City. 27 Utah 2d. 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1972), and Greenhalgh v. 
Pavson Citv. 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975), both of; which held that 
specific limitation periods mentioned in Utah's Govenmental 
Immunity Act took precedence over the general tolling provision for 
minority. We believe that the argument for unconstitutionality is 
much stronger in this case than in Scott, which was a case in which 
the cause of action was a result of legislative gr^ce - that is, waiver 
of governmental immunity, since this case involves a common law 
cause of action for negligence. 
The Utah Legislature itself recognized the applicability of Scott 
to medical malpractice actions. In 1979, the Legislature attempted to 
cure the effect of Scott v. School Board on the malpractice statute of 
limitations by amending § 78-14-4(2) as follow^: 
The provision of this section shall apply to 
all persons, regardless of minority and 
other legal disability under § 78-12^36 or 
any other provision of the law. ... 
[Emphasis added.] 
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Therefore the legislature, expressly recognizing the effect of 
Scott on the statute, amended it in 1979 in an attempt to overrule 
Scott. The Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. School Board, holding, 
as a matter of constitutional law, that minors were in all cases 
entitled to the protection of the tolling provisions in § 78-12-36(1), 
invalidated the malpractice limitations statute as applied to minors. 
In Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), the court stated that, 
"the general rule from time immemorial is that the ruling of a court 
is deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively 
and prospectively." [Id., at 676] Thus, an amendment by the 
legislature does not overrule or invalidate a court decision, but 
rather changes the then existing law. It is the legislature's job to 
"make the law", and that of the judiciary to interpret it. Rampton v. 
Barlow. 23 U.2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 383 (1970). It seems apparent 
that the legislature misread Scott to be a case of merely statutory 
dimensions. To the contrary, Scott's wellsprings are constitutional, 
and the legislature cannot circumvent the constitution, as applied by 
this Court, simply by making its denials of due process and equal 
protection more explicit. On its face, Scott is a constitutional ruling 
by the Utah Supreme Court. Thereafter, the legislature was 
powerless to amend § 78-14-4 to preclude application of § 78-12-36 
to the claims of minors12. The legislature is not free to make its own 
constitutional interpretations, as that would be an impermissible 
intrusion upon the primary function of the judicial branch. See 
12
 Of significance we found no decisions by the Utah Supreme Court 
which hold that a statute of limitations can be applied to minors; 
actions in spite of the express language of § 78-12-36(1). 
26 
Rampton v. Barlow. 23 U.2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 383 (1970) (defining 
the judiciary's primary function as interpreting the law). The Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act statute of limitations purports to apply 
to all persons regardless of minority or other legal disability. This 
statute violates Jennifer Chapman's constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and Article I, Sections 2 and 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
In determining whether a statute violates equal protection, the 
court must first decide the standard by which the statute is to be 
judged. Three tests have evolved for the consideration of a statute 
under equal protection analysis: the "strict-scrutiny" test; the 
"means-focus: test; and the "rational basis" test. 
C. STRICT SCRIJTTNY TEST 
Some states have invalidated statutes limiting the right to 
recover damages for personal injuries under the strict scrutiny test 
on the basis that such a right is fundamental. See. Kenyon v. 
Hammer. 688 P.2d 961 (Ariz. 1984) (Arizona limitations period in 
medical malpractice case found unconstitutional as applied to 
minors); and White v. State. 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983). In White, 
the Montana Supreme Court invalidated a statute limiting damages 
recoverable against governmental entities based on Article II, 
Section 16 of the Montana Constitution which is in all respects 
identical to Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never determined whether the 
right of a minor to recover damages for personal injuries in a medica 
malpractice action is "fundamental", but on the basis of the holding 
in Scott v. School Board (a statute which offends the tolling provision 
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of §78-12-36 denies minors due process and equal protection), we 
believe that it will hold that the strict scrutiny test should be applied 
in this case. Should the Court so hold, it will be defendants1 burden 
to demonstrate the compelling state interests which justify the 
abrogation of minors' rights. 
D. MEANS-FOCUS TEST 
The means-focus or "heightened scrutiny" standard of review 
provides an intermediate level of review for equal protection 
analysis between strict scrutiny and the rational basis test. The 
means-focus test has been used in areas where the rights involved 
are substantial, not merely social policy or economic in nature, but 
which do not rise to the level of fundamental interests or suspect 
classifications. 
Under the intermediate test for equal protection, there must be 
a relationship between the statutory classifications created and the 
purposes sought to be accomplished by the statute. That is, the 
classification (in this case abrogation of the tolling provisions § 78-
12-36(1) for minor victims of medical malpractice only) must be 
directly and rationally related to the accomplishment of the 
legislative purpose. The main objectives of Utah's Medical 
Malpractice Act as set forth in § 78-14-2 were to decrease or 
stabilize the cost of medical malpractice insurance and thereby 
decrease or stabilize health care costs generally, as well as to ensure 
the continued availability of insurance to Utah physicians, and 
quality health care to Utah citizens. 
Our attempts to determine the basis for Utah's medical 
malpractice legislation in 1976 and 1979 has met with no success. So 
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far as we can tell, there is none. What little legislative history there 
is for the Act consists of self-serving declarations from malpractice 
insurers that there was a "problem." No explanation for the cause of 
the problem was given the legislators, and the record is devoid of 
any examples from Utah. With regard to the so-called "long-tail" 
problem with claims of minors, one New York case is cited. 
The only evidence that is available indicates that the "long-tail" 
or unfiled existing case potential problem with claims of minors, did 
not and does not exist in Utah, and that the cost of malpractice 
insurance premiums plays an infinitesimal role in the cost of health 
care. Where is the "long-tail" problem that motivated the Utah 
Malpractice Act so that "liability insurance premiums can be 
reasonably and accurately calculated?" [§ 78-14-2]. The "long-tail" 
problem, as any reasonable person would expect, was and is non-
existent. The parents or guardians of an injured infant will naturally 
assert its cause of action as soon as possible in i^ iost instances. It is 
only in the very rare case such as this where the child's legal injury 
is not discoverable for four years, or where the parents are ignorant 
or unmotivated that infants need the protection of a tolling statute 
such as § 78-12-36(l).3 Those rare instances will cause no harm to 
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insurance companies who routinely grossly overestimate future 
losses in order to offset investment income13. 
Malpractice awards and defense costs are paid by insurance 
companies. Insurance companies are not part of the health care 
system, they are independently operated and immensely successful 
businesses which, through issuance of malpractice insurance and 
collection of premiums, play an indirect and insignificant role in 
health care costs. The occasionally large verdicts and settlements 
that recieve a great deal of publicity and attention are not health 
care costs. The only cost to health care consumers involved in a 
million dollar judgment against a physician is the premium that 
physician pays annually for malpractice insurance. 
The fact that an alleged medical malpractice "crisis" never 
existed, or abated, was the basis for several states1 conclusions that 
their malpractice acts were unconstitutional. In Arneson v. Olson. 
270 N.W. 2d 125 (N.D. 1978), the North Dakota Supreme Court struck 
down that State's entire malpractice act, in part, on the basis of a 
finding that no crisis existed. The court stated: 
13
 By year-end 1983, the Utah Medical Insurance Association 
("UMIA"), Utah's primary malpractice carrier, had paid out a total of 
$2.7 million on claims in its five-year history. During the same 
period it had collected over $15 million in premiums, and earned 
$4.3 million in investment income. Yet, for 1983 alone, UMIA 
claimed $3.1 million in unpaid losses (more than its five-year total), 
to bring its total unpaid losses as of the year-end 1983 to over $8.5 
million. (Sources: UMIA financial statement for 1983, and Best's 
Insurance Reports for property-casualty companies, 1983 and 1984.) 
Note that these disproportionate projections all took place during a 
period when minors' causes of action were statutorily limited to a 
maximum of four years. 
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The evidence in the case before us, however, 
indicates that either the legislature was 
misinformed or subsequent events have 
changed the situation substantially. [Id. 
at 136]. 
The court in Arneson utilized the intermediate test for equal 
protection analysis. In Boucher v. Sayeed. 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983), 
the court utilized the lower-tier rational-basis standard in finding its 
entire malpractice act unconstitutional. The court stated: 
Because no obvious crisis exists to support 
the challenged legislation, we shall ... 
decline to speculate about unexpressed or 
unobvious permissible state interests. 
Absent a crisis to justify the enactment of 
such legislation, we can ascertain no 
satisfactory reason for the separate and 
unequal treatment that it imposes on medical 
malpractice litigants. The statute 
constitutes special class legislation 
enacted solely for the benefit of specially 
defined defendant health-care providers. 
[Id* at 93]. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated unequivocally that the 
original factual predicate for a statute and any subsequent change 
from the situation which prompted the legislation are relevant to 
equal protection analysis. See, discussion of Mai an v. Lewis, infra. 
The evidence available clearly demonstrates that there is no 
factual predicate for the discriminatory classification created by § 
78-14-4 and that abrogation of minors' rights guaranteed by § 78-
12-36(1) will not substantially further the objectives of the 
malpractice act. Therefore, § 78-14-4 should be found 
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unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection insofar as the statute 
applies to minors. 
E. THE RATIONAL BASTS TEST 
Under the rational basis test for equal protection, a statute will 
be found constitutional so long as it is rationally related to a 
legitimate legislative purpose. Allen v. Intermountain Health Care. 
635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981). 
The real effect of § 78-14-4 is to single out a tiny minority of 
injured malpractice victims to bear the entire burden of: reducing 
the cost of malpractice insurance; preventing the excessive practice 
of defensive medicine; reducing health care costs generally; making 
sure physicians stay in Utah; and making sure malpractice insurance 
remains available in Utah. fSee. Utah Code Ann. §78-14-2 (1953, as 
amended)]. That is a considerable burden for Jennifer Chapman and 
malpractice victims like her to bear. Since she and others like her 
had no say whatever in the legislation, this court should look closely 
at the legislation to see if it is, in fact, rational. This Court has a duty 
to protect the important rights of individuals, especially individuals, 
like minors, who are unable to speak for themselves. There is little 
doubt that the Utah Supreme Court does not consider the rational 
basis test a rubber-stamp for ill-conceived and ineffective legislation. 
In Malan v. Lewis. 693 P2d 661 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme 
Court struck down this state's automobile guest statute. Malan 
provides unambiguous evidence of the Utah Supreme Court's 
willingness to closely scrutinize a statute whose discriminatory effect 
is obvious. The Utah court explicitly stated that it is not bound to 
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apply the federal rubber-stamp analysis under tthe rational basis 
test. This court stated: 
Although Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution incorporates the same general 
fundamental principles as are incorporated 
in the equal protection clause, our constitution 
and application of Article I, Section 24 are not 
controlled by the Federal courts' construction 
and application of the equal protection clause. 
Case law developed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment may be persuasive in applying 
Article I, Section 24 ..., but that law is not 
binding so long as we do not reach 3 result 
that violates the equal protection clause. 
(Citations omitted.) The different language 
of Article I, Section 24, the different constitutional 
contexts of the two provisions, and different 
jurisprudential considerations may le&d to a different 
result in applying equal protection principles under 
Article I, Section 24 than might be reached under Federal 
law. [Id.] 
It is difficult to determine exactly what test the court applied 
for eqttal protection. All indications are that it utilized the rational 
basis test, although, if that is the case, it is clear that Utah's rational 
basis test has teeth. The equal protection analysis was based on 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, which provides: "All 
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." It was 
explained that Article' I, Section 24 was meant to protect against two 
types of discrimination: 
First, law must apply equally to all persons 
within a class. (Citations omitted). $econd. 
the statutuorv classifications and the different 
treatment given the classes must be based on 
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differences that thave a reasonable tendency 
to further the objectives of the statute. Citing. 
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, other 
citations omitted.) If the relationship of the 
classification to the statutory objectives is 
unreasonable or fanciful, the discrimination is 
unreasonable. [Id.] (emphasis added).] 
The court's holding is clear that a statutory classification must be 
based on differences which have a reasonable tendency to further 
the objectives of the statute, and, if the relationship to the statutory 
objectives is unreasonable or fanciful, the discrimination is 
unreasonable. Indeed, the majority of the Malan equal protection 
analysis involves a determination of whether the "classifications 
established [by the guest statute] provide a reasonable basis for 
promoting [the statute's] objectives." [Id.] The court goes on to state: 
When persons are similarly situated, it is 
unconstitutional to single out one person or 
group of persons from among a larger class 
on the basis of a tenuous justification that 
has little or no merit. [Id.] 
And still further: 
Equal protection of the law, both state and 
federal, "requires more of a state law than 
non-discriminatory application within the 
class it establishes." (Citations omitted.) 
The classification must rest on some 
difference which "bears a reasonable and 
just relation to the act in respect to which 
the classification is proposed, and can never 
be made arbitrarily and without any such 
basis ... [Arbitrary selection can 
never be justified by calling it 
classification." (Citations omitted.) "The 
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courts must reach and determine the question 
whether the classifications drawn in a 
statute are reasonable in light of its 
purpose..." (Citations omitted.) [Id..] 
Not only is § 78-14-4 as applied to minors unreasonable in light of 
its purpose, it also irrationally discriminates within the class of 
tortiously injured minors by applying the shortened statute of 
limitations only to medical malpractice victims. Significantly, the 
Utah Supreme Court held the attempt to limit minors' causes of 
action in governmental immunity cases unconstitutional despite the 
same policy considerations which allegedly exist on the malpractice 
area, namely; to limit the cost of insurance and claims, and to 
decrease the burden on the public who indirectly must pay such 
increased costs. 
F. THE MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DEPRIVES MINOR PLAINTIFFS OF ACCESS TO 
THg COURTS 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have a remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this state, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 
[Emphasis added]. 
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The effect of § 78-14-4 on minors is to bar their cause of action in 
malpractice cases before they ever legally have a chance to assert it. 
As such, the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution is plainly 
violated and the statute should be struck down, at least as it pertains 
to minors. [See^concurring opinion of Justice Howe in Myers v. 
McDonald, supra. 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981).] 
The best example of a case construing an open court's provision 
in a medical malpractice context is Sax v. Votteler. 648 S.W.2d 661 
(Tex. 1983). Sax is identical to this case in all relevant respects. 
Prior to 1975, Texas law allowed for the tolling of limitations in all 
tort actions by minors until two years after attaining majority or 
removal of disabilities. In 1975, the legislature changed the 
limitations period in malpractice actions to two years from the date 
of treatment, and specifically provided that, "This section applies to 
all persons regardless of minority or other legal disability." 
Article I, Section 13, of the Texas Constitution (substantially 
identical to Utah's Art. I, Section 11) provides in relevant part: "All 
courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, ... 
shall have remedy by due course of law." In determining the 
constitutionality of the statute under the open courts provision, the 
Texas court utilized the following test: 
We hold, therefore, that the right to bring 
a well-established common law cause of 
action cannot be effectively abrogated by 
the legislature absent a showing that the 
legislative basis for the statute outweighs 
the denial of the constitutionally-
guaranteed right of redress. In applying 
this test, we consider both the general 
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purpose of the statute and the extent 
to which the litigants' right to redress is 
effected. [LL at 665-66]. 
The Court, with reasoning virtually identical to that of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Scott v. School Board, held the statute 
unconstitutional as applied to minors. The Court held: 
A child has no right to bring a cause of 
action on his own unless disability has been 
removed. (Citations omitted.) If a minor 
does bring a cause of action in his own 
behalf, the action is subject to being 
abated upon a timely plea of the defendant. 
(Citations omitted.) If the parents, 
guardians, or next friends of the child 
negligently fail to take action in the 
child's behalf within the time 
provided..., the child is precluded from 
asserting his cause of action under that 
statute. Furthermore, the child is 
precluded from suing his parents on account 
of their negligence, due to the doctrine of 
parent-child immunity. (Citations omitted) 
The child, therefore, is effectively 
barred from any remedy if his parents 
fail to timely file suit. Respondents argue 
that parents will adequately protect the 
rights of their children. This court, however, 
cannot assume that parents will act in such 
a manner. It is neither reasonable nor 
realistic to rely upon parents, who may 
themselves be minors, or who may be 
ignorant, lethargic, or lack concern, to 
bring a malpractice lawsuit action Within 
the time provided, fid, at 666-67]. 
The Utah Supreme Court unequivocally voiced its displeasure 
at this possibility in Foil v. Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), (see 
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supra) a case in which the court held that the "discovery rule" 
applies to medical malpractice actions. With regard to the 
elimination of a cause of action before it accrues, the court stated: 
To say that a cause of action accrues to a 
person when she may maintain an action 
thereon and at the same time, that it 
accrues before she has or can reasonably be 
expected to have knowledge of any wrong 
inflicted upon her is patently inconsistent 
and unrealistic. She cannot maintain an 
action before she knows she has one. To say 
to one who has been wronged, "you had a 
remedy, but before the wrong was 
ascertainable to you, the law stripped you 
of your remedy," makes a mockery of the 
law. [IsL at 148-49 (citations omitted.)] 
Under §78-14-4 a minor has a maximum of four years in which 
to assert a cause of action whether or not his injury is discovered or 
known to him. The statute, of course, has the same potential effect 
with adults, with one major difference. An adult has four years in 
which to discover and file a claim. The adult at least has a chance. A 
minor cannot file a claim on his own behalf even if a legal injury is 
discovered. The minor must depend on third persons to assert a 
claim for him. It begs the question to assert that the statute is saved 
by its "plaintiff or patient" language. That does nothing to change the 
fact that there is no one with a legal obligation to protect a minor 
plaintiffs interests, and a minor, particularly a completely 
incompetent one, like Jennifer Chapman is powerless to protect his or 
her own. The reasoning of the Utah Court in Switzer v. Reynolds. 606 
P.2d 244, 248-49 (Utah 1980), is completely consistent with this 
reasoning. In Switzer it was held that the statute of limitations for 
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wrongful death actions was tolled during a claimant's minority 
despite the fact that an action could be brought on behalf of the 
minor by a parent or guardian. This was also the precise rationale 
for the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling in Barrio v. San Manuel 
Division Hospital for Magma Copper Company. ^92 P.2d 290 (Ariz. 
1983). In 1976 Arizona passed its own special statute of limitations 
for malpractice actions fA.R.S. § 12-564(D)], which said it applied 
"notwithstanding the provisions of § 12-502" wljich is Arizona's 
general tolling provision applicable to minors three years or until the 
age of ten to bring a cause of action for medical malpractice. Arizona 
had previously held that the right to maintain a cause of action for 
personal injuries was fundamental. [Kenyon v. Hammer. 688 P.2d 
961 (Ariz. 1984).] Nevertheless, its rationale fob striking down the 
statute of limitations as applied to minors in medical malpractice 
actions is persuasive under any standard. The court stated: 
We have held that "an infant cannot bring or 
defend a legal proceeding in person." 
(citations omitted) We are aware, o$ 
course, that an action can be brought on 
behalf of the minor by a next friend, 
guardian ad litem, or general guardian. No 
doubt, most claims of minors are so 
presented. We are well aware that where a 
chance of substantial recovery exists, there 
is no lack of advocates willing to undertake 
appropriate procedures to find and appoint a 
guardian ad litem or to obtain a "next 
friend" so that the action may be brought. 
While the vast majority of claims on behalf 
of injured minors will still be brought 
within a relatively short time after the 
injury occurs, this all depends upon good 
fortune; the minor himself is helpless, 
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particularly when under ten years of age. 
The minor possesses a right guaranteed by 
the constitution, but cannot assert it 
unless someone else, over whom he has no 
control, learns about it, understands it, is 
aware of the need to take prompt action, and 
in fact takes such action. 
We recognize, also, that some children are 
without parents or have parents who do not 
fulfill commonly accepted parental 
functions. The statute makes no exception 
for children who have unconcerned parents, 
children in foster care, or those in 
institutions; ... 
As to parents themselves, some are lazy or 
frightened or ignorant or religiously 
opposed to legal redress. Still, they have 
their remedy available to them if they 
choose to use it. A child does not. rid.1 
There is no reason why the rationale in Sax and Barrio, which is 
identical to that utilized by the Utah Supreme Court in Scott v. School 
Board, should not apply in a medical malpractice case. Section 78-
14-4, as applied to Jennifer Chapman denies her access to the courts, 
and is thereby unconstitutional. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that any statute which 
purports to deny minors the protection of the tolling provision in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12(1) is unconstitutional as a denial of due 
process and equal protection. The medical malpractice statute of 
limitations attempts to abrogate that tolling provision and is thereby 
unconstitutional. The medical malpractice statute of limitations is 
also unconstitutional on the ground that it denies minors access to 
the courts as guaranteed by Utah Constitution. Art. I, Section 11. 
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Very significantly this Court passed upon a constitutional 
question similar to the one raised in this case in }he recent Utah case 
of Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). That 
case involved the Utah Statute of Repose. Beech Aircraft claimed 
that the minor plaintiffs claims were barred because they were not 
asserted within the statutory period since the tin}e periods set forth 
in the statute had run before plaintiffs claims aro$e. The trial court 
awarded Beech summary judgment on all theories of liability on the 
ground that Section 3 of the Utah Product Liability Act ("Act"), U. C. 
A., 1953, 7B-15-1, £ts£jj.M barred all actions against Beech. Section 3 
of the Act, commonly called a statute of repose, provides: 
(3) No action shall be brought for the recovery of 
damages for personal injury, death or damage to property 
more than six years after the date of initial purchase for use or 
consumption, or ten years after the date of manufacture of a 
product, ..." 
The plaintiffs made the same claim we make for exactly the same 
reasons. They relied upon Article I, Section II oti the Utah 
Constitution which declares that an individual shall have a right to a 
"remedy by due course of law" for injury to one's "person, property, 
or reputation." and claimed that the statute of repose which deprived 
the plaintiffs of that right violated that provision. 
The plaintiffs claimed that although the statutory provision in 
question purported to grant a reasonable time for the filing of a 
claim the plaintiffs claims had expired before th i^r causes of action 
accrued and they were deprived of that right. Ift forming its opinion 
that the statute in question was unconstitutional, the court 
exhaustively reviewed the historical roots of the constitutional 
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provision and the decisions construing it and cited the United States 
Supreme Court's opinion in Wilson v. Iseminger. 185 U. S. 55 (1902). 
It commented that the Wilson court "noted the fundamental 
obligation of government to provide reasonable remedies for wrongs 
done persons" and quoted from the case with approval as follows: 
Every government is under obligation to its 
citizens to affords them all needful legal 
remedies. . . . A statute could not bar the 
existing rights of claimants without affording 
this opportunity (to try rights in the courts); if 
it should attempt to do so, it would not be a 
statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt 
to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever 
might be the purport of its provisions. " M. 
at 62. 
The Berry court went on to quote "the basic rule" from 51 Am. 
Jur. 2d Limitations of Actions. 28, at 613: 
It is riot within the power of the 
legislature, under the guise of a limitation 
provision, to cut off an existing remedy 
entirely, since this would amount to a denial 
of justice, and, manifestly, an existing right of 
action cannot be taken away by legislation 
which shortens the period of limitation to a 
time that has already run. 
For the foregoing reasons, the statute in question should be 
declared unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
The court below granted summary judgment when there were 
material questions of fact on the question of whether the statute of 
limitations had run in this case. Those questions included questions 
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as to whether the defendants had hidden information from the 
plaintiffs as to the cause of the plaintiffs injuries and whether false 
information had been given to plaintiffs. Arising from the questions 
of fact were issues as to whether the plaintiffs know of the "legal 
cause" of the plaintiffs injuries and whether th$ defendants were 
estopped to raise these issues. In addition the trial court barred all 
discovery and granted summary judgment on the pleading of the 
fraud issue by the plaintiff when this issue was properly pled and 
placed into issue by plaintiffs and upon the question of whether care 
provided by the defendants within the period of the statute of 
limitations was negligently done. 
This court has held that statutes which deny minors the equal 
protection of the laws, due process or access to the courts are 
unconstitutional. The medical malpractice statute of limitations 
attempts to do just that and is unconstitutional. 
In consequence of all of the arguments set forth herein, 
appellant respectfully requests that this court reverse the summary 
judgment and dismissal on behalf of defendants entered by Judge 
Wilkinson below, and Order that the matter proceed to trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /J>_ day of August, 1986. 
P. Richard Meyer 
Robert N. Williams 
P. O. Box 2608 
Jackson, Wyoming 83001 
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Utah Bar No. 697 
Counsel for Appellants 
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KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Veasy, Bowman & Hospital Entities 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
_u,cOFF*cE 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through 
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, 
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA 
CHAPMAN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, 
et al. [Redesignated I.H.C. 
HOSPITALS, INC., et al.] 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C85-6782 
(HON. HOMER F. WILKINSON) 
McConkie 
Jushnell 
jonal Corporation | 
300 EAST 
LAKE CITY 
*H 84111 
The motions to modify the designation of the hospital 
defendants, for summary judgment, and to dismiss of defendants 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a hospital oirganized to do business 
in the State of Utah; PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER, a 
hospital organized to do business in the State of Utah; 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, a Utah corporation dba PRIMARY 
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; IHC HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah corporation dba 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; THE HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION OF 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a former or 
A-l 
0O02&t> 
present Utah corporation dba PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL 
("hospital defendants") L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D., and KAREN BOWMAN, 
R.N., and the motion to dismiss of defendant Garth Meyers, M.D., 
having come on regularly before the above-entitled court on 
February 5, 1986, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, and 
the court having reviewed the memoranda, pleadings, affidavits 
and records on file and having heard oral argument from counsel, 
and having taken the matter under advisement and finding that 
good cause has been shown, and that there is no just reason for 
delaying entry of final judgment herein as to these parties, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) the motion to modify 
the designation of hospital defendants, being without opposition, 
is granted and the names of the hospital defendants in this 
action are removed and I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, d/b/a Primary Children's Medical Center is 
substituted therefor; and (2) the motions for summary judgment 
and to dismiss of the defendants L. George Veasy, M.D., Karen 
Bowman, R.N. and the hospital defendants, and the motion to 
dismiss of defendant Garth Meyers are granted and final judgment 
in favor of said defendants and against the plaintiffs is hereby 
entered with prejudice. f 
DATED this / day of Ma-reh-, 1986. 
McConkie 
jshnell 
>nal Corporation ] 
300 EAST 
AKE CITY 
-I 84111 
«E$ig OMER F. WILKINSON 
District Judge 
00 & & 
McConkie 
ishnell 
nal Corporation 
300 EAST 
AKE CITY 
4 84111 
L/S . Cl'oyd Poe lina n 
Attorney for Defendants Veasy, Bowman 
and Hospital Defendants 
Approved as to form: 
Rob^ift N. Williams, Esq. / J^j I 
Attorney for Plaintiffs ufo*^*-^ 
Gary B./Ferguson, Esq.' 
Attorney^for Defendant Meyers 
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This is to certify that I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER, by depositing the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, on this the day of March, 1986 
to the following: 
Kathryn Collard, Esq, 
401 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
P. Richard Meyer, Esq. 
Robert N. Williams, 'Esq. 
P. 0. Box 2608 
Jackson, Wyoming 83001 
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq. 
Gary D. Stott, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
B. Lloyd Poelman, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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H nt-xOM H'.N!)H:r CLERK: 
, ^ /3 .<> M S l . C O U f 
W*2* DEPUTV CLfliK 
P. Richard Meyer 
Rober t N. Williams 
At to rneys at law 
165 West Pearl 
Jackson, Wyoming 
(307) 733-8300 
At to rneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD trrnrr iAj nicTD; LAKE COUNTY 
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through 
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, AND 
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA 
CHAPMAN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
) AFFIDAVIT OF ROi 
CHAPMAN 
vs. 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
Civil No. C55-6752 
W I L K I N S O N ) 
d? tf> 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Robert Chapman, being first duly sworn under oath 
deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the plaintiffs in the above entitled matter. My 
wife, Teresa, and I are the parents of Jennifer Chapman who was 
born on August 10, 1972. She is now 13 years old and is severely 
brain damaged. She will never walk, or talk, and is permanently and 
irreversibly disabled, completely incompetent, and wholly 
dependent upon others for all of her bodily functions. 
2. During the first five months of her life, Jennifer experienced 
several blue spells for which she was taken to a hospital in Ogden, 
Utah for treatment. The doctors who had been treating her in Ogden 
had not been able to properly diagnose the problem and then sent 
her to Dr. Veasy at the Primary Children's Hospital for specialized 
care. Dr. Veasy diagnosed the illness as a heart problem which he 
attempted to cure with medication. After medication failed to cure 
the problem an operation was performed to install a device called a 
Waterston shunt. The first shunt did not functon properly and on 
February 28, 1973, a second operation was performed to adjust the 
shunt. 
3. Jennifer recovered from the anesthesia and we were 
permitted to visit with her. I observed that Jennifer was crying and 
awake. After some 10 to 15 minutes had passed my wife returned 
to visit her again and according to my wife she stayed in the room 
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h a d g o n e . ff a n d w a s s o u n d i n g an alarm ><• : • *-•> attendance 
told my wife that the alarm was caused by difficulties with the 
machine My • .« /ife w a s in the room, for 15-2 0 m i n u t e s before t h e 
n u r s e s noticed th a t j e 11 n i f e r wa s h a vi n g a c 0 r 0 n a 1 y a 1: 1 e s t, 
E in e 1 g e n c y 1 e :;: 1 1 s s i t a t i \ • c m e a s 1 11: e s s a 7 e cl J e 1:1r:i i f € 1: '" s 1 i f = il:  • 1 11 : r 
was permanently damaged, 
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h r / c n o t h : : ; • ' ;;*-r'•;-er.-e ~. >* 1 •.,iy-»ne. 
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defendants named in this case. 
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6. Soon after Jennifer received her brain damage we filed suit 
against the Ogden doctors who had treated Jennifer for the blue 
spells she had experienced during the first five months of her life. 
We claimed that the Ogden physicians had waited too long to send 
Jennifer to Dr. Veasy for specialized care. Dr. Veasy persuaded us 
and our lawyers that although he was critical of the delay on the part 
of the Ogden doctors in sending Jennifer to him for care, that he 
"knew for a fact" that Jennifer's brain damage was due to blood clots, 
that it was unavoidable and unrelated to anyone's misconduct. Dr. 
Veasy recommended dismissal of the suit. Based upon Dr. Veasy's 
statements we dismissed the suit against the Ogden physicians. At 
that time and at all times up until July, J 954 we believed and 
trusted Dr. Veasy and relied upon the statements he made to us. 
7. After the dismissal of the Ogden case the defendants Veasy, 
Meyers and the Hospital continued to provide treatment to Jennifer 
and they continued to represent to us that the medical records and 
tests showed that the cause of her injuries were blood clots and that 
it was unavoidable and that any omission on the part of the nurses 
did not cause Jennifer's brain damage. We trusted and believed the 
defendants until the summer of 1954, when we received medical 
records of the Hospital which related to Jennifer's injuries. Contrary 
to the statements of the defendants I discovered that the medical 
records did not contain any tests results which would indicate the 
true cause of Jennifer's injuries and they showed uncertainty as to 
the cause of the injuries. These records were therefore in direct 
conflict with the statments of Dr. Veasy to us. 
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Ms. Kathryn Collard 
At torney at Law 
40 1 Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(501 ) 5 3 4 - 1 6 6 4 
P. Richard Meyer 
Rober t N. Williams 
At to rneys at law 
165 West Pearl 
Jackson, Wyoming 53001 
(307) 733-6300 
nuri'.NCiEnx'S OFFICE 
JRHZQ 12 07 PH'85 
At to rneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through 
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, AND 
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA 
CHAPMAN, individually. 
vs. 
\ P l M A K i i I I I I Ml- I'll HO "PIT'" ' I ' i il 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
) 
AFFADAVITUr •• 
CHAPMAN 
Civil No. C85-&782 
) (HON. H. F. WILKINSON) 
tf* N * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
The undersigned Teresa Chapman, being first duly sworn 
under oath deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the plaintiffs in the above titled matter. I am 
competent to testify to the matters and things set forth in this 
affidavit and things are true except those things which are set forth 
on my information and belief and, as to those things, I believe them 
to be true. 
2. My husband, Robert, I and are the parents of Jennifer 
Chapman. She was born on August 10, 1972, and is now 13 years 
old. Jennifer is severely brain damaged. She will never walk, or talk: 
and is permanently disabled. She is completely incompetent, and 
wholly dependent on others for all of her bodily functions. 
3. Jennifer, who seemed otherwise normal to us experienced 
several blue spells in the first five months of her life. My husband 
and I took her to some doctors in Ogden, Utah for treatment of these 
blue spells. Those doctors failed to completly diagnose her condition 
and they referred us to Dr. Veasy at the Primary Children's Hospital 
for specialized treatment. 
4. Dr. Veasy diagnosed the illness as a heart problem which he 
attempted to stabilize with medication until an operation could be 
performed. An operation was subsequently performed to install a 
device called a Waterston shunt. The first shunt did not function 
properly and on February 28, 1973, a second operation was 
performed to adjust the shunt. 
^ 
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blood clots that flooded her brain and that he "knew for a fact" that 
the blood clots had caused her injury. In addition, he said that this 
event was unavoidable and had nothing to do with any negligence on 
the part of anyone. 
6. Soon after Jennifer received her brain damage we filed suit 
against the Ogden doctors who had treated Jennifer for the blue 
spells she had experienced during the first five months of her life. 
We claimed that the Ogden physicians had waited too long to send 
Jennifer to Dr. Veasy for specialized care. Dr. Veasy was critical of 
the delay on the part of the Ogden doctors in sending Jennifer to him 
for care, but he persuaded us and our lawyers that he "knew for a 
fact" that Jennifer's brain damage was due to blood clots, that it was 
unavoidable and unrelated to anyone's misconduct. He 
recommended dismissal of the suit. Based upon Dr. Veasy's 
statements we dismissed the suit against the Ogden physicians At 
that time and at all times up until July, 1954, we believed and 
trusted Dr. Veasy and relied upon the statements he made to us. 
9. After the dismissal of the Ogden case the defendants Veasy, 
Meyers and the Hospital continued "to provide treatment to Jennifer 
and they continued to represent to us that the medical records and 
tests showed that the cause of her injuries were blood clots and that 
it was unavoidable and that any omission on the part of anyone 
caused Jennifer's brain damage. No one associated with any of the 
defendants ever told me that the nurse's statements to me, that the 
heart monitor was functioning incorrectly, were false. 
10. We trusted and believed the defendants until the July of 
1984, when we received medical records of the Hospital which 
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During these periods Jennifer received treatment for her brain 
damaged condition and its complications from all of these 
defendants. 
Dated this 16th day of January, 1986. 
Teresa Chapman 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of January, 1986. 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: 
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[Typed copy of Exhibit "A"] 
Dr. George Veasy 
Primary Childrens Hospital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Dr. Veasy: 
Some time ago I sat in your office and asked that you advise 
me and help me to make a decission concerning a malpractice suite 
in Jennifers behalf. Since that meeting I have given daily 
thought and prayer as to which dirrection I should go in 
providing Jennifer with security for the time she will be here on 
earth. I am writing this letter so that you will have a better 
understanding of our situation and why I am making the decision 
that I am. 
First of all in our meeting you seemed more concerned about 
what our atorney would bennifit from the case rather than what 
Jennifer could obtain. We sat and talked for probably an hour 
and a half and never once did you ask how Jennifer was doing. 
You refered only to those damn lawers and the blood money that I 
was seeking. I have pondered this in my hart daily sience that 
meeting. I was raised in a religious home and taught honesty and 
respect for working to obtain what we have. Our profit has 
warned us against accepting filthy lucre and that money in of 
itself is not evil but the honesty and (undecipherable) in which 
we obtain it is the important fact. 
I would at this time like to assure you that obtaining 
filthy lucre or blood money as you have called it is not my 
intention. I am not seeking to destroy any doctors or put a 
hospital out of business. Insurance premiums our paid to protect 
us all against hardship in this world. I have to insure my 
business against fire, theft, and accident to protect me as a 
business man. It is not something that only doctors pay. 
What has brought me to the decision to go ahead with the 
suite are two events that have happened in our lives and I would 
like to explain them to you so you can understand our feelings. 
First of all in our home we have living with us an uncle who 
is mentally handicaped. We live with him to take care of his 
needs and try to bring him some sort of happiness in this life. 
We have now found it necessary to move after five years of caring 
for this man. We find that the cost of housing is increasing so 
oooo 
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rapidly and our family is growing to quickly that we have no 
alternative but to get into our own home. In the nearly five 
years we have been here not one relative has offered to help us 
with this burden. We have become the center of jealousy and back 
biting among religious people. Now that we are building our own 
home it seems that no one wants the responsibility of caring for 
Uncle Lynn. The fighting and accusing is already taking place. 
It looks as though I might have to build an extra room in our 
basement to let him live in because no one wants him. I can not 
in good conciance after what has happened here in the last five 
years leave Jennifer as a burden to someones family if something 
should happen to Teresa or I before she is gone. The burdens and 
responsibilities have been tremendous. 
On Feb. 24th of this year my wife and our five children were 
driving to pick me up from work when an International Scout went 
out of control and ran into the back of our car. At this point 
there were some minor injuries but everyone seemed to be okay. 
Because of the impact the doors were jamed and they could not get 
out of the car. While they were waiting for help a semi truck 
and trailer went out of control and hit them again knocking them 
a hundred and fifty feet down the highway and completely 
demolishing our vehicle. When the police Arrived they found my 
wife unconcious in the back seat of the cap and my eight year old 
boy administering first aid to Jennifer and our baby Cory. The 
entire family had to be taken to the hospital and treated. 
Teresa, Jennifer and Cory were admitted because of their 
injuries. They were there for a period of five days before being 
released. While they were there the nurses found it so difficult 
to care for Jennifer that in five days they fed her exactly 1/2 
of one meal. That 1/2 of a meal took a nurse over 1-1/2 hours to 
get down her. The rest of the meals were fed to her buy me. I 
had to close up my business to care for her. I takes a 
tremendous amount of paciance to care for her and I can't leave 
her to die in the hands of people who don't care for her and love 
her the way we do. Because of the accident I realize how close I 
came to losing my wife and children. Had Teresa been killed 
Jennifer would have been left in this world without the ability 
to care for herself and it would be just a matter of time before 
she would be back to the stage we brought her home from the 
hospital in four years ago as doctor Myer put it, a vegetable. 
Now I am well aware that I am not qualified medically or 
legally to answer all the questions pertaining to a malpractice 
suite. The way I understand the law the burden of proof is on me 
to prove both negligence and physical damage. The negligence is 
obvious but to what extent the physical damage can be linked to 
this negligence only a man of your medical knowledge can know for 
-2-
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sure. I do know that besides being mentally and physically 
handicaped Jennifer also has an enlarged heart making it 
impossible for her to ever lead any kind of normal active life 
and eventually will be the cause of her death. She was hurt and 
hurt bad because of wrong decisions made in her early life. The 
laws in the state of Utah allow for compensation for pain and 
suffering. She suffered and felt pain for the first five months 
of her life only to be turned away by doctors that didn't have 
time for little girls that could hold their breath. She felt 
death in her soul at least twice a month and fought for her very 
life only to have it completely destroyed. You told me if she 
had died you would have been obligated to testify in her 
behalf. A dead person feels no pain and suffering. She is 
entitled to security for as long as she is willing to go on 
struggling for her life. This case has to be weighed upon its 
individual merits and not by what it costs for insurance for each 
bed in a hopsital. I reemphasize that I am not seeking to 
destroy anyone or collect a fortune in blood money. The help 
provided by the state and federal governments to the handicapped 
are a mockery to the society we live in. They only provide 
administrative moneys and do nothing for the individual 
patient. I can no longer depend on other people to care for my 
daughter. She is only loved in our home and the financial burden 
is to great for me to bare alone. I don't know what Jennifers 
future will bring but as her father I beg you to consider 
Jennifer as an individual and not an insurance burden to each bed 
in each hospital. Before too long my atorney will be in contact 
with you and I ask that you realize that he represents Jennifers 
interests and set aside your feeling toward the legal 
profession. It is imparative that we have honest factual 
answers. 
I do hope that we can continue through life as the best of 
friends and that I can alway intrust Jennifers life in your very 
capable hands. 
Sincerely, 
Robert Chapman 
P.S. Thanks for your time. 
-3- 0 0 0 ° ^ 
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78-13-11 JUDICIAL CODE 
Waiver. Couit. Elliot v. Whitmore, 10 U. 246, 
If no objection is made to jurisdiction of **• 4(31, applying 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 3 
court to which case was transferred by „ .. . . _, -
court on its own motion, or to any of the C o l l a t e r a l References, 
proceedings growing out of order changing VenueO=374. 
place of trial, it is waived; objection comes 92 C.J.S. Venue § 197. 
too late if made for nrst time in Supreme 77 Am. Jur. 2d 938, Venue § 88. 
78-13-11. Duty of clerks—Fees and costs—Effect on jurisdictioi] 
"When an order is made transferring an action or proceeding for tr 
the court must transmit the pleadings and papers therein to the co 
to which it is transferred. The costs and fees therefor and filing 
papers anew must be paid by the party at whose instance the order \ 
made; provided, that when such order is made for the reason that 
cause was commenced in the wrong county, the costs of transfer t 
filing the papers anew shall be paid by the plaintiff in the action wit 
ten days after the making of such order, or said cause shall be dismis 
for want of jurisdiction. The court to which an action or proceeding 
transferred shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction as if it had b< 
originally commenced therein. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104-13-11. Venue<©=>79, 80. 
, , .T . 92 C.J.S. Venue § 207. 
Compiler s Notes. ^
 ? 7 A m > J u p > £ d g V e n u e ^ 
This section is similar to former section , 
104-4-11 (Code 1943) which was repealed Power to withdraw or modify oi 
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. granting change of venue, 59 A. L. E. • 
CHAPTER 14 
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST HEALTH CARE PROVIDER! 
Section 78-14-1. Short title of act. 
78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act. 
78-14-3. Definition of terms. 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations—Exceptions—Application. 
78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent—Proof required of patient— 
fenses—Cons0nt to health care. 
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee, T 
ranty, contract or assurance of result. 
78-14-7. Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint. 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. 
78-14-9. Professional liability insurance coverage for providers—Insura 
commissioner may require joint underwriting authority. 
78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
78-14-11. Act not retroactive—Exception. 
78-14-1. Short title of act).—This act shall be known and may be ci 
as the "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act." 
History: L. 1976, en. 23, § 1. viding for a prohibition of ad dami 
f A . clauses in malpractice actions; provid 
Title of Act. ^ ^
 a requirement for notice prior to fi] 
An act relating to malpractice actions malpractice actions; providing for p 
against health care providers; providing odic payment of future damages awar 
a definition of health care providers; pro- in malpractice actions; p r o v i n g fo 
viding for a shortening of the statute of revision of the collateral source rule 
limitations for malpractice actions; pro- malpractice actions; providing for a c 
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Whitmore, 10 U. 246, 37 
I Comp. Laws 1888, § 3199. 
aces. 
§197. 
I 938, Venue § %%. 
ct on jurisdiction.— 
proceeding for trial, 
therein to the court 
irefor and filing the 
stance the order was 
the reason that the 
)sts of transfer and 
in the action within 
se shall be dismissed 
ion or proceeding is 
ion as if it had been 
207. 
40, Venue § 90. 
raw or modify order 
venue, 59 A. L. E. 362. 
RE PROVIDERS 
of act. 
l . 
juired of patient—De-
tch of guarantee, war-
providers—Insurance 
\ authori ty . 
and may be cited 
ition of ad damnum 
e actions; providing 
otice prior to filing 
providing for peri-
ire damages awarded 
i s ; providing for a 
teral source rule in 
providing for a codi-
fication of the elements of a malpractice 
action based upon failure to obtain in-
formed consent; providing for authori ty 
for the insurance commissioner to require 
a joint underwri t ing author i ty ; providing 
powers to the insurance commissioner to 
examine individual professional l iabili ty 
claim files and to require separate report-
ing of financial da t a re la t ing to profes-
sional liability insuiance for health care 
providers; and amending section 31-3-1, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, section 31-5-21, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 
by chapter 45, Laws of Utah 1963, as 
amended by chapter 69, Laws of Utah 
1971, and section 78-12-28, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 
212, Laws of Utah 1971.—L. 1976, ch. 23. 
78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act.—The 
legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for dam-
ages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health care 
lias increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the in-
surance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice 
insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and increased claims 
is increased care cost, both through the health care providers passing the 
cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing de-
fensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a 
lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discouraged from con-
tinuing to provide services because of the high cost and possible unavail-
ability of malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the 
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health care 
system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures 
designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide 
health-related malpractice insurance while at the same time establishing a 
mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it be-
comes unavailable from private companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a 
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care 
providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which profes-
sional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately cal-
culated; and to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evalua-
tion and settlement of claims. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 2 . 
78-14-3, Definition of terms.—As used in this act: 
(1) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, associa-
tion, corporation or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered 
or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital, physician, 
registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, dental 
hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical 
therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturopathic phy-
sician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiol-
ogist, speech pathologist, certified social worker, social service worker, so-
cial service aide, marriage and family counselor, or practitioner of obstet-
rics, and others rendering similar care and services relating to or arising 
out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons, and officers, em-
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ployees, or agents of any of \,\\Q above acting in the course and scope 
their employment. 
(2) "Hospital'' means a public or private institution licensed under t 
Hospital Licensing Act. 
(3) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine and si] 
gery as provided in subsection 158-12-3(1). 
(4) "Registered nurse" nutans a person licensed to practice profession 
nursing as provided in section 58-31-9. 
(5) "Licensed practical niirse" means a person licensed to practice 
a licensed practical nurse as provided in section 58-31-10. 
(6) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to practice nurse-mi 
wifery as provided in section 58-13-17 [58-31-17], 
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as define 
in section 58-7-6. 
(8) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to practice dental h 
giene as defined in section 58-8-|9. 
(9) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to, practice optometry 
defined in section 58-16-11. 
(10) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy 
provided in section 58-17-2. 
(11) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physic 
therapy as provided in section $8-24-6. 
(12) "Podiatrist" means a person licensed to practice chiropody as d 
fined in section 58-5-12. > 
(13) "Psychologist" mean^ a person licensed to practice psycholog 
as defined in section 58-25-4. 
(14) "Chiropractic physici|an" means a person licensed to practice cl 
ropractic as provided in subsection 58-12-3(3). 
(15) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed to practi< 
naturopathy as defined in section 58-12-22. 
(16) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice o 
teopathy as provided in section 58-12-6. 
(17) "Osteopathic physiciin and surgeon" means a person licensed 1 
practice osteopathy as provided in section 58-12-7. 
(18) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology •< 
provided in section 58-1-5. 
(19) "Speech pathologist" means a person licensed to practice speec 
pathology as provided in section 58-1-5. 
(20) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice '< 
a certified social worker as provided in section 58-35-5. 
(21) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to practice i 
a social service worker as provided in section 58-35-5. 
(22) "Social service aide'* means a person licensed to practice as 
social service aide as provided ih section 58-39-8 [58-35-5]. 
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(23) "Marriage and family counselor" means a person licensed to prac-
tice as a marriage counselor or family counselor as provided in section 
58-39-6. 
(24) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice 
obstetrics in this state as provided in subsection 58-12-3(5). 
(25) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care 
provider, under a contract, express or implied. 
(26) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided 
in section 31-2-2. 
(27) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, at-
torney-in-fact or other legal agent of the patient. 
(28) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or 
unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to another. 
(29) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means an}'* 
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of 
warranty, wrongful death or otherwise, based upon alleged personal inju-
ries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have 
been rendered by the health care provider. 
(30) "Health care" means any act, or treatment performed or fur-
nished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health 
care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical 
care, treatment or confinement. 
(31) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment, 
care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future 
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, §3. Cross-Reference. 
, . ,T ,. Hospital Licensing Act, 26-15-54 et seq. 
Compiler's Notes. r b ' H 
The bracketed retercnces to section 58-
31-17 in subd. (6) and section 58-35 5 in 
subd. (22) were inserted by the compiler. 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions—Application. — (1) No 
malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it 
is commenced within* two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect'or occurrence, except that : 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider 
is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, 
the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plain-
tiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the 
patient's body, whichever first occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented 
from discoverinc* misconduct on the part of a health care provider because 
that health care provider lias affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal 
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within 
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one year after the plaintiff of patient discovers, or through the use of r 
sonable diligence, should hive discovered the fraudulent concealme 
whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons regardl 
of minority or other legal disability and shall apply retroactively to all p 
sons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care p 
viders and to all malpractice actions against health care providers baj 
upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior to the effective d 
of this act; provided, however, that any action which under former 1 
could have been commenced after the effective date of this act may 
commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under fom 
law; but any action which under former law could have been commem 
more than four years after the effective date of this act may be commenc 
only within four years after the effective date of this act. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 4. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This act became effective sixty days 
after adjournment of the legislature on 
January 31, 1976. 
Cross-Reference. 
Separate trial of s ta tu te of l imitations 
issue in malpractice actions, 78-12-47. 
Collateral References. 
Limitation of Actions<£=>31, 40, 55(3) ; 
Physicians and Surgeons<S=318(l%). 
53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 74; 54 
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §§ 174, 183 
et seq.; 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons 
§60. 
61 Am. Jur . 2d 307 et seq., Physicians, 
Surgeons, and Other Healers § 181 et seq. 
Applicability, in action against nurse 
in her professional capacity, of stat 
of limitations applicable to malpract 
8 A. L. R. 3d 1336. 
Medical malpractice: amendment ] 
porting to change the nature of the act 
or theory of recovery, made after stat 
of limitations has run, as relat ing b 
to filing of original complaint, 70 A. L 
3d 82. 
Statute of limitations applicable to r 
practice action against physician, surge 
dentist, or similar practitioner, 80 A. L 
2d 320. 
Statute of limitations relat ing to mi 
cal malpractice actions as applicable 
actions against unlicensed practit ioner, 
A. L. R. 3d 114. 
"When statute of limitations commer 
to run against malpractice action ba 
on leaving foreign substance in patie 
body, 70 A. L. R. 3d 7. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Foreign object left in body. 
Where foreign object was negligently 
left in body of patient during operation 
and patient was thus ignorant of r ight of 
action for malpractice, cause of action did 
not accrue until patient learned of presence 
of such foreign object. Christiajnsen v. 
Rees, 20 U. (2d) 199, 436 P . 2d 435. 
Statutory changes. 
Although action against physician arose 
under 78-12-25 whieh'set a four-yeaf limita-
tion period, the subsequent amendment to 
78-12-28 which included physicians and 
provided a two-year s ta tute of l imitations 
shortened the time for asserting the r ight 
of action; plaintiffs had two years Irom the 
effective date of the amendment to as 
their cause, which they failed to do £ 
therefore, the cause of action was bar 
Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P . 2d ' 
Tolling statute. 
Where physician continued to t reat 
t ient after removing her tonsils, repress 
ing that her throat condition would cl 
up, defense of limitations was not ava 
ble to physician in malpractice act 
since his repiesentations were in nat 
of fraudulent concealment of plaint 
cause of action and statute of limitati 
did not begin to run until falsity of s 
representations was discovered. Petele 
Robison, 81 U. 535, 17 P . 2d 244. 
78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent—Proof required of pati 
-Defenses—Consent to healtb care.—(1) THien a person submits to hea 
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care rendered by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that what 
the health care provider did was either expressly or impliedly authorized 
to be done. For a patient to recover damages from a health care provider 
in an action based upon the provider's failure to obtain informed consent, 
the patient must prove the following: 
(a) That a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient 
and health care provider; and 
(b) The health care provider rendered health care to the patient; and 
(c) The patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health 
care rendered; and 
(d) The health care rendered carried with it a substantial and sig-
nificant risk of causing the patient serious harm; and 
(e) The patient was not informed of the substantial and significant 
risk; and 
(f) A reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not 
have consented to the health care rendered after having been fully informed 
as to all facts relevant to the decision to give consent. In determining what 
a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would do under the 
circumstances, the finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of the patient be-
fore health care was provided and before the occurrence of any personal 
injuries alleged to Have arisen from said health care; and 
(g) The unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proxi-
mate cause of personal injuries suffered by the patient. 
(2) I t shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health 
care provider based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent if: 
(a) The risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered 
was relatively minor; or 
(b) The risk of serious harm to the patient from the health care pro-
vider was commonly known to the public; or 
(c) The patient stated, prior to receiving the health care complained 
of, that he would accept the health care involved regardless of the r isk; 
or that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would 
be entitled to be informed; or 
(d) The health care provider, after considering all of the attendant 
facts and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and 
extent to which risks were disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably 
believed that additional disclosures could be expected to have a substantial 
and adverse effect on the patient's condition; or 
(e) The patient or his representative executed a written consent which 
sets forth the nature and purpose of the intended health care and which 
contains a declaration that the patient accepts the risk of substantial and 
serious harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of 
health care and which acknowledges that health care providers involved 
have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory 
manner and that all questions asked about the health care and its attendant 
risks have been answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient or his 
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representative; such written consent shall be a defense to an action agai 
a health care provider based upon failure to obtain informed consent unl 
the patient proves that the person giving the consent lacked capacity 
consent or shows by clear and convincing proof that the execution of 
written consent was induced by the defendant's affirmative acts of frau< 
lent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prevent a 
person eighteen years of age or over from refusing to consent to hea 
care for his own person upon personal or religious grounds. 
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to cons« 
to any health care not prohibited by law: 
(a) Any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his minor child; 
(b) Any married person, for a spouse ; 
(c) Any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether f 
mally serving or not, for the minor under his care and any guardian 
his ward ; 
(d) Any person eighteen years of age or over for his or her pan 
who is unable by reason of age, physical or mental condition, to prov 
such consent; 
(e) Any patient eighteen years of age or over; 
(f) Any female regardless of age or marital status, when given 
connection with her pregnane^* or childbirth; 
(g) In the absence of a parent, any adult for his minor brother 
sister; and 
(h) In the absence of a parent, any grandparent for his minor grai 
child. 
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes health c. 
treatment or procedures for another as provided by this act shall be s 
ject to civil liability. 
History: I*. 1976, ch. 23, § 5 . 70 C J . S . Physicians and Surgeons § 
51 Am. Jur . 2d 223 et seq., Physici 
Collateral References. Surgeons, and Other Healers § 105 et 
Physicians and SurgeonsC=315(8), 16. 
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarant 
warranty, contract or assurance of result.—No liability shall be impoi 
upon any health care provider on the basis of an alleged breach of gu 
antee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be obtained from z 
health care rendered unless tjie guarantee, warranty, contract or assurai 
is set fortli in writing and signed by the health care provider or an auth 
ized agent of the provider. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 6 . Collateral References. 
Cross-Reference Statute of FraudsC=>37, 97. 
Cross Reference. ^
 Q J ^ ^ ^ ^ p 
Blood transrusions, procurement and use
 e^ SCf,
 a
* ' 
of blood a service rather than a sale, 26 
-
9
 *• Blood transfusion, liability for injuri 
death from, 45 A. L. R. 3d 1364. 
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78-14-7. Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint.—No dollar amount 
shall be specified in the prayer of a complaint filed in a malpractice action 
against a health care provider. The complaint shall merely pray for such 
damages as are reasonable in the premises. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 7. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 67. 
61 Am. Jur . 2d 359 et seq., Physicians, 
CoUateral References. Surgeons, and Other Healers § 215 et seq. 
Physicians and Surgeons<£=*18(ll). 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action.—No malpractice action 
against a health care provider may be commenced unless and until the 
plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at 
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action. Such no-
tice shall include the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, 
time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allega-
tions of misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of 
the alleged injuries and other damages sustained. Notice may be in letter 
or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff and his attorney. Service shall 
be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner prescribed by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons and com-
plaint in a civil action. Such notice shall be served within the time allowed 
for commencing a malpractice action against a health care provider. If the 
notice is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the appli-
cable time period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against 
the health care provider shall be extended to ninety days from the date 
of service of notice. 
His tory : L. 1976, ch. 23, § 8. CoUateral References. 
Cross-Reference Physicians and Surgeons<$=>18(2). 
uross i teierence.
 7 0 C J S p n v s i c i a n s a n d Surgeons §59. 
Service of summons and complaint, Rules
 6 1 A m > j u r > 2"d 306, Physicians, Surgeons, 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 4.
 a I l ( i o the r Healers § 180.' 
78-14-9. Professional liability insurance coverage for providers—Insur-
ance commissioner may require joint underwriting" authority.—If the com-
missioner finds after a hearing that in any part of this state any pro-
fessional liability insurance coverage for health care providers is not 
readily available in the voluntary market, and that the public interest 
requires, he may by regulation promulgate and implement plans to provide 
insurance coverage through all insurers issuing professional liability 
policies and individual and group accident and sickness policies providing 
medical, surgical or hospital expense coverage on either a prepaid or an 
expense incurred basis, including personal injury protection and medical 
expense coverage issued incidental to liability insurance policies. 
His tory : L. 1976, ch. 23, § 9 . separate financial data pertaining to pro-
fessional liability insurance, 31-5-21. 
Cross-References. 
Commissioner to examine insurer 's flics, CoUateral References, 
etc., 31-3-1. InsuranceC=>ll.l . 
Governmental entities may purchase lia- 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64. 
bil i ty insurance, (3J-30-2S to* 63-30-34. ^ 43 Am. Jur . 2d 108 et seq., Insurance 
Insurers ' annual statemcuts to contain § 51 et seq. 
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78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity Act.—The pro-
visions of this act shall apply to nuilprjictice actions against health care 
providers which are brought under the Iptah Governmental Immunity Act 
in so far as they are applicable; provide^, however, that this act shall in no 
way affect the requirements for filing notices of claims, times for commenc-
ing actions and limitations on amounts recoverable under the Utah Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, §10. Criss-Reference. 
"Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 63-
30-fl et seq. 
78-14-11. Act not retroactive—Exception.—The provisions of this act, 
with the exception of the provisions relating to the limitation on the time 
for commencing an action, shall not apply to injuries, death or services 
rendered which occurred prior to the effective date of this act. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 14. 
Compiler's Notes. 
p l i c a t i o n of any provision to any person 
r~ circumstance, is held invalid, the re-
This act became effective sixty days 
after adiournment of the legislature on 
Janua ry 31, 1976. 
Separabil i ty Clause. 
Section 15 of Laws 1976, ch. 23, pro-
vided: "1£ any provision of this act, or the 
a 
or 
matnder of this act shall not be affected 
thereby." 
Collateral References. 
StatutesC=>:261 et seq. 
82 C.J.S. Statutes §412 et seq. 
73 Am. Jur . 2d 485 et seq., Statutes 
§ 3f 7 et seq. 
CHAPTER 15 
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT 
Section 78-15-1. Short title of act. 
78-15-2. Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act. 
78-15-3. Statute of limitations—Application. 
78-15-4. Prayer for damages. 
78-15-5. Alteration or modification of product after sale as substantial con-
tributing cause—Manufacturer or seller not liable. 
78-15-6. Defect or defective condition leaking product unieasonably dangerous 
—Rebuttable presumption. 
78-15-1. Short title of act.—This 
as the "Utah Product Liability Act." 
History: C. 1953, 78-15-1, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 149, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act enacting sections 78-15-1 through 
78-15-G, Utah Code Annotated 1953; relat-
ing to product l iabili ty; creating a Utah 
Product Liabil i ty Act; setting forth the 
purpose and intent of the act; establishing 
a s ta tute of limitations for product lia-
bility cases; providing for exceptions to 
the s t a tu te ; grant ing limited immunity to 
act shall be known and mav be cited 
manufacturers or sellers of products 
against actions based on personal injury, 
death or damage to propeity resulting 
from the use of products; providing tests 
for determining whether or not the prod-
uct shall be deemed to be defective or 
unreasonably dangerous; establishing re-
but table ptesumptions of freedom from 
defects; and precluding certain evidence 
from admission in civil actions.—L. 1977, 
ch. 149. 
78-15-2. Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act.—(1) 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for 
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78-13-6. Arising without this state in favor of resident. 
Option to choose where to bring action. the plaintiff had the option under this see-
Where Utah plaintiff sued defendant cor- t i o n t o choose where to bring suit, and where 
poration, which had its principal place of h e c h o s e t o b r i n g s u i t i n h i s county of resi-
business in Weber County, Utah, on a transi- d e n c e t h e district court had no prerogative to 
tory cause of action arising without Utah, change venue to Weber County upon defend-
ant's, request. Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co. 
(1983) 660 P 2d 229. 
78-13-11. Duty of clerk — Fees and costs — Effect on jurisdiction. 
Cross-References. Fee of clerk on change of venue, 21-2-2. 
Adjustment of costs between counties for 
change of venue, 17-15-19. 
CHAPTER 14 
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 
Section 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application. 
78-14-4.5. Amount of award reduced by amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiff 
-- No reduction where subrogation right exists — Collateral sources defined 
— Procedure to preserve subrogation rights — Evidence admissible — Excep-
tions. 
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in malpractice action. 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. 
78-14-12. Department of Business Regulation to provide panel — Procedures established by 
department — Procedures for requesting panel — Notice — Statute of limita-
tions tolled — Composition of panel — Members to receive per diem and travel 
expenses — Department authorized to set license fees of health care providers 
to cover costs of administering panel 
78-14-13. Proceedings — Authority of panel — Rights of parties to proceedings — Jurisdic-
tion of panel. 
78-14-14. Decision and recommendations of panel — No judicial or other review. 
78-14-15. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in subsequent action — Panelist may not 
be compelled to testify — Immunity of panelist from civil liability. 
78-14-16. Proceedings considered a binding arbitration hearing upon written agreement oi 
parties — Compensation to members of panel. 
78-14-1. Short title of act. 
Law Reviews. 
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered 
the Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 
Utah L. Rev. 495. 
78-14-4. S ta tu t e of l imitations — Exceptions — Application. (1) No malprac 
tice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is commencec 
within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of rea 
sonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but nol 
to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or occur 
rence, except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is thai 
a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shal 
be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discov 
ers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existenc< 
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of resident. 
aintiff had the option under this sec-
choose where to bring suit, and where 
se to bring suit in his county of resi-
the district court had no prerogative to 
venue to Weber County upon defend-
equest. Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co. 
660 P 2d 229. 
Effect on jurisdict ion. 
>f clerk on change of venue, 21-2-2. 
,LTH CARE PROVIDERS 
cation. 
jllateral sources available to plaintiff 
exists — Collateral sources defined 
its — Evidence admissible — Excep-
talpractice action. 
ie panel — Procedures established by 
panel — Notice — Statute of limita-
>mbers to receive per diem and travel 
license fees of health care providers 
of parties to proceedings — Jurisdic-
i judicial or other review. 
bsequent action — Panelist may not 
elist from civil liability. 
hearing upon written agreement of 
id. 
— Application. (1) No malprac-
brought unless it is commenced 
overs, or through the use of rea-
% whichever first occurs, but not 
act, omission, neglect or occur-
the health care provider is that 
i patient's body, the claim shall 
%
 the plaintiff or patient discov-
ld have discovered, the existence 
of the foreign object wrongfully left in| the patient's body, whichever first occurs; 
and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from dis-
covering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the 
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discov-
ered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minor-
ity or other legal disability under section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the 
law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and cor-
porations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against 
health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior 
to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that any action which under 
former law could have been commenced after the effective date of this act may 
be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law; 
but any action which under former law Could have been commenced more than four 
years after the effective date of this act may be commenced only within four years 
after the effective date of this act. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 4; 1979, ch. 128, Minors. 
§1 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1979 amendment inserted "under sec-
tion 78-12-36 or any other provision of law" 
near the beginning of subsec. (2); and made 
a minor change in punctuation. 
Constitutionality. 
This section does not violate equal protec-
tion of the law requirements of Art. I, § 24 
of the state Constitution, and it is not an 
unconstitutional "special law" in violation of 
Art. I, §26. Allen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc. (1981) 635 P 2d 30. 
Provision of this section that statute of 
limitations is not tolled because of injured 
party's minority does not violate equal pro-
tection of laws; does not violate due process 
of law; and does not violate open courts pro-
visions of state constitution, art. I, §2. 
Hargett v. Limberg (1984) 598 FSupp 152. 
Discovery of "injury." 
In this section the term discovery of 
"injury" means discovery of injury and the 
negligence which resulted in the injury; i.e., 
"injury" means legal injury. Foil v. Ballinger 
(1979) 601 P 2d 144. 
Medical malpractice action against a doc-
tor for alleged negligent diagnosis and treat-
ment of a child was barred by this section's 
statute of limitations where action was 
brought by child's mother individually and as 
guardian ad litem for child more than two 
years after mother discovered legal injury to 
child. Hargett v. Limberg (1984) 598 FSupp 
152. 
When statute begins to run. 
Statute begins to run when an injured per-
son knows or should know that he has suf-
fered a legal injury. Foil v. Ballinger (1979) 
601 P 2d 144. 
Statute of limitations provided in this sec-
tion begins to run when plaintiff is aware of 
facts that would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude that he may have a cause of action 
against health care provider; a legal determi-
nation of negligence is not necessary to start 
statute of limitations running. Hargett v. 
Limberg (1984) 598 FSupp 152. 
Law Reviews. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1980 
Utah L. Rev. 649. 
78-14-4.5. Amount of award reduced by amounts of collateral sources avail-
able to plaintiff — No reduct ion where subrogation r ight exists — Collateral 
sources defined — P r o c e d u r e to preserve subrogat ion r igh ts — Evidence 
admissible — Except ions . (1) In all malpractice actions against health care 
providers as defined in Subsection 78-14-3 (29) in which damages are awarded to 
compensate the plaintiff for losses sustained, the court shall reduce the amount 
of such award by the total of all amounts paid to the plaintiff from all collateral 
sources which are available to him; however, there shall be no reduction for collat-
eral sources for which a subrogation right exists as provided in this section nor 
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shall there be a reduction for any collateral payment not included in the award 
of damages. Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by the trier 
of fact, the court shall receive evidence concerning the total amounts of collateral 
sources which have been paid to or for the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise 
available to him. The court shall also take testimony of any amount which has 
been paid, contributed, or forfeited by, or on behalf of the plaintiff or members 
of his immediate family to secure his right to any collateral source benefit which 
he is receiving as a result of his injury, and shall offset any reduction in the award 
by such amounts. No evidence shall be received and no reduction made with respect 
to future collateral source benefits except as specified in Subsection (4). 
(2) For purposes of this section "collateral source" means payments made to 
or for the benefit of the plaintiff for: 
(a) medical expenses and disability payments payable under the United States 
Social Security Act, any federal, state, or local income disability act, or any other 
public program, except the federal programs which are required by law to seek 
subrogation; 
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability insurance, automobile accident 
insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage, and any 
other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the 
plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or provided by others; 
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, group, organization, partnership, 
or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, den-
tal, or other health care services, except benefits received as gifts, contributions, 
or assistance made gratuitously; and 
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers 
or any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability. 
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or received prior to settle-
ment or judgment, a provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30 days 
before settlement or trial of the action a written notice upon each health care 
provider against whom the malpractice action has been asserted. The written notice 
shall state the name and address of the provider of collateral sources, the amount 
of collateral sources paid, the names and addresses of all persons who received pay-
ment, and the items and purposes for which payment has been made. 
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs that provide payments or 
benefits available in the future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent 
available irrespective of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of the likelihood 
or unlikelihood that such programs, payments, or benefits will be available in the 
future is also admissible. The trier of fact may consider such evidence in determin-
ing the amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for future expenses. 
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to recover the amounts of such 
benefits from a health care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or entity 
as reimbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judg-
ment, including any payments made under Chapter 19, Title 26, except to the extent 
that subrogation rights to amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are pre-
served as provided in this section. All policies of insurance providing benefits 
affected by this section are construed in accordance with this section. 
History: C. 1953, TS-14-4.5, enacted by L. rights; and providing an effective date. — 
1985, ch. 237, § 1. Laws 1985, ch 237. 
Enacts: 78-14-4.5. Title of Act. 
An act relating to health care malpractice Effective Date. 
actions; prohibiting compensation to plaintiff Section 2 of Laus 19S5, ch. 237 provided: 
for costs or expenses that were paid from a "This act takes effect on July 1, 1985." 
collateral source in the absence of subroga-
tion rights; requiring notice of subrogation 
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Inacts: 78-14-4.5. 
ective Date. 
.ection 2 of Lasvs 1985, ch. 237 provided: 
us act takes effect on July 1, 19S5." 
78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent, etc. 
power to submit to surgical procedures upon 
herself; husband's consent to such medical 
procedures are not required. Reiser v. Lohner 
(1982) 641 P 2d 93. 
Law Reviews. 
California Supreme Court Expands the 
Informed Consent Doctrine; Physicians Have 
a Duty to Obtain an Informed Refusal: 
Truman v. Thomas, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 933. 
Cross-References. 
Abortion, informed consent requirements^ 
76-7-305, 76-7-305 5. 
Blood donation by minor over eighteen], 
parental consent not required, 15-2-5. 
Sterilization, informed consent for proce^ 
dure, 64-10-1. 
Venereal disease, minor's power to consent 
to treatment, 26-6-18. 
Pregnancy and childbirth. 
Where married pregnant woman is in fu|l 
possession of her faculties, she alone has th^ 
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in malpractice action. 
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care provider as defined in Section 
78-14-3, an attorney shall not collect a contingent fee for representing a client seek-
ing damages in connection with or arising out of personal injury or wrongful death 
caused by the negligence of another which exceeds 33-!/3% of the amount recovered. 
(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether the recovery is by settlement, 
arbitration, judgment, or whether appeal is involved. 
Enacts: 78-14-7.5. 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws 1985, ch. 67 provided: 
"This act takes effect on July 1,1985." 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-7.5, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 67, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to health care malpractice; 
providing limitations on amounts of contin-
gent fees an attorney mav collect in malprac-
tice action; and providing an effective dat^. 
- Laws 1985, ch. 67. 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. No malpractice action against 
a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the pro-
spective defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice 
of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of 
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place of the occur-
rence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of 
the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages 
sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or 
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the man-
ner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons 
and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in 
which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. Such 
notice shall be served within the time 
against a health care provider. If the 
allowed for commencing a malpractice action 
I notice is served less than ninety days prior 
to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the mal-
practice action against the health care provider shall be extended to 120 days from 
the date of service of notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed 
as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, and shall 
apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This section shall 
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not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care 
provider. 
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 8; 1979, ch. 128, 
§2. 
Compiler 's Notes. 
The 1979 amendment, in the first para-
graph, subst i tu ted " in i t i a t ed" for "com-
menced" in the first sentence; inserted "a 
general statement o f after "shall include" in 
the second sentence; subs t i tu ted "or his 
attorney" for "and his attorney" in the third 
sentence; added "or by certified mail * * * 
date of mailing" to the fourth sentence; sub-
stituted "120 days" for "ninety days" in the 
last sentence; and added the second para-
graph. 
Consti tutionali ty. 
The 1979 amendment of this section did 
not violate constitutional requirement that 
acts embrace no more than one subject; title 
of a bill need not describe each and every 
change contained in the bill, and the title of 
an act amending a previous act is sufficient 
if it simply specifies the section to be 
amended. McGuire v. University of Utah 
Medical Center (1979) 603 P 2d 786. 
The 1979 amendment of this section is not 
unconstitutional as being a special law; the 
amendment clearly operates uniformly upon 
a class of persons consisting of all those hav-
ing a cause of action arising prior to the 
effective date of the Health Care Malpractice 
Act whether they have been filed or not. 
McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Cen-
ter (1979) 603 P 2d 786. 
This section does not constitute unconsti-
tutional special legislation. Yates v. Vernal 
Family Health Center (1980) 617 P 2d 352. 
This section does not violate Art. I, § 24 or 
Art. I, § 26 of the state Constitution. Allen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (1981) 635 P 
2d 30. 
Action not timely filed. 
Where plaintiff experienced complications 
from breast surgery necessitating a second 
operation on November 2, 1976, and then 
filed a notice of intent under this section on 
August 17, 1978, but did not file the action 
until January 18, 1979, the action was prop-
erly dismissed since the action had to be filed 
within 120 days of the filing of the notice of 
intent (December 15, 1978). Millett v. Clark 
Clinic Corp. (1980) 609 P 2d 934. 
Applicability. 
The 90-day period following the giving of 
notice under this section is not a statutory 
prohibition under § 78-12-41 so as to toil the 
s t a tu te of l imi ta t ions during the 90-day 
period since the specific provision of this sec-
tion controls the general provision of 
78-12-41. Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp. (1980) 
609 P 2d 934. 
Fai lure to comply. 
The notice provisions of this section were 
not complied with where plaintiff's husband, 
rather than plaintiff herself, filed the notice; 
however, such failure to comply was not an 
adjudication on the merits, but merely a pro-
cedural defect that did not relate to the mer-
its of the basic action, and plaintiff was 
entitled to serve a proper notice and file 
another complaint pursuant to the require-
ments of 78-12-40. Yates v. Vernal Family 
Health Center (1980) 617 P 2d 352. 
Notice. 
Filing of the complaint did not satisfy the 
notice requirement as this section required 
notice be given ninety days before filing. 
Vealey v. Clegg (1978) 579 P 2d 919, decided 
prior to 1979 amendment. 
Retroact ive effect of amendment . 
The 1979 amendment of this section was 
retroactive; the notice of intent to sue provi-
sion is not applicable to causes of action aris 
ing before enactment of the Malpractice Act 
(April 1, 1976) and does not determine wher 
an action is "commenced." Foil v. Ballinge] 
(1979) 601 P 2d 144; McGuire v. University o 
Utah Medical Center (1979) 603 P 2d 786. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Application. 
Notice requirements applied to causes of 
actions arising before and filed after the 
effective date of this section. Vealey v. Clegg 
(1978) 579 P 2d 919, decided prior to 1979 
amendment. 
When action is commenced. 
Filing of complaint without the notic 
required by this section prior to its amend 
ment in 1979 was sufficient to commence th 
action, since dismissal (due to absence o 
notice) was without prejudice and thus nc 
an adjudicat ion on the mer i t s . Foil > 
Ballinger (1979) 601 P 2d 144. 
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78-14-12. Department of Business Regulat ion to provide panel — Proce-
dures established by department — Procedures for requesting panel — Notice 
— Statute of limitations toiled — Composition of panel — Members to receive 
per diem and travel expenses — Department authorized to set license fees of 
health care providers to cover costs of administering panel. (1) The Department 
of Business Regulation shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical malpractice 
cases against health care providers as defined in Section 78-14-3 filed after July 
1, 1985. The department shall establish procedures for prelitigation consideration 
of personal injury and wrongful death claims for damages arising out of the provi-
sion of or alleged failure to provide health care. The proceedings are informal and 
nonbinding, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation. 
Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are confidential, privileged, 
and immune from civil process. 
(2) The party initiating a medical malpractice action shall file a request for 
prelitigation panel review with the Department of Business Regulation within 60 
days after the filing of a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Sec-
tion 78-14-8. The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to commence 
action. The request shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice 
and request. 
(3) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this section tolls 
the applicable statute of limitations for a period of 60 days following the issuance 
of an opinion by the prelitigation panel. The opinion shall be sent to all parties 
by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
(4) The department provides for and appoints an appropriate panel or panels 
to accept and hear complaints of negligence and damages, made by or on behalf 
of any patient who is an alleged victim of negligence. The panels are composed 
of: 
(a) one member appointed from a list provided by the commissioners of the 
Utah State Bar, who is a resident lawyer currently licensed to practice law in this 
state who shall serve as chairman of the panel; 
(b) one member who is licensed under Section 78-14-3, who is practicing in the 
same specialty as the proposed defendant, appointed from a list provided by the 
professional association representing the same area of practice as the health care 
provider; or in claims against only hospitals or their employees, one member who 
is an individual currently serving in hospital administration and appointed from 
a list submitted by the Utah Hospital Association; and 
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital employee, or other health 
care provider, and who is a responsible citizen of the state, selected and appointed 
by a unanimous decision of the members comprising the panel. 
(5) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that he 
or she is without bias or conflict of interest with respect to any matter under con-
sideration. 
(6) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem compen-
sation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established by rules of 
the Department of Business Regulation. 
(7) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health care 
providers, the Division of Registration of the Department of Business Regulation 
is authorized to set license fees of health care providers within the limits estab-
lished by law equal to their proportionate costs of administering prelitigation pan-
els. None of the costs of administering the prelitigation panel shall be borne by 
the claimant, except as provided under Section 78-14-16. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-12, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 238, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to health care malpractice 
actions; establishing a prelitigation panel 
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appointed by the Department of Business Enacts: 78-14-12, 78-14-13, 78-14-14, 
Regulation for prelitigation consideration of 78-14-15, 78-14-16. personal injury and wrongful death claims; 
establishing procedures; and providing an 
effective date. — Laws 1985, ch. 238. Section 6 of Laws 1985, ch. 238 provided: 
Effective Date. 
Section 6 of I 
"This act takes effect on July 1,1985." 
78-14-13. Proceedings — Authori ty of panel — Rights of parties to pro-
ceedings — Jurisdiction of panel. (1) No record of the proceedings is required 
and all evidence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the parties or witnesses 
who provided the evidence, documents, and exhibits at the end of the proceedings. 
The hearing panel has the authority to issue subpoenas and to administer oaths, 
and any expenses incurred by the panel in this regard are paid by the requesting 
party, including, but not limited to, witness fees and mileage. The proceedings are 
informal and formal rules of evidence are not applicable. There is no discovery or 
perpetuation of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special order of th( 
panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstances. 
(2) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with counsel, and participate ii 
the proceedings, except upon special order of the panel and unanimous agreemen 
of the parties. The proceedings are confidential and closed to the public. No part 
shall have the right to cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary formalitie 
of civil trials and court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however, reques 
special or supplemental participation of some or all parties in particular respect! 
Communications between the panel and the parties, except the testimony of th 
parties on the merits of the dispute, are disclosed to all other parties. 
(3) The Department of Business Regulation shall appoint a panel to considc 
the claim and set the matter for panel review immediately upon receipt of 
request. A panel retains jurisdiction of any claim for 90 days from the date of filir 
the request. The jurisdiction of the panel may be extended and the proceeding m; 
continue for 30-day periods upon written agreement of all parties and the membe 
of the panel. 
(4) Parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings before a panel. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-13, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 238, § 2. 
78-14-14. Decision and recommendations of panel — No judicial or oth 
review. The panel shall render its opinion in writing not later than 30 days af 
the end of the proceedings. The panel shall determine on the basis of the evidei 
whether each claim against each health care provider has merit or has no me 
and, if meritorious, whether the conduct complained of resulted in harm to 
claimant 
There is no judicial or other review or appeal of the panel's decision or rec( 
mendations. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-14, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 238, § 3. 
78-14-15. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in subsequent actioi 
Panelist may not be compelled to testify — Immunity of panelist from < 
liability. Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical review panel 
its results, opinions, findings, and determinations are not admissible as evid 
in an action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of competent juri( 
tion. No panelist may be compelled to testify in a civil action subsequently 
with regard to the subject matter of the panel's review. A panelist has immt 
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History: C. 1953, 
1985, ch. 238, § 4. 
78-14-15, enacted by |L. 
78-14-lG. Proceedings considered a binding arb i t ra t ion hearing upon wri t-
ten agreement of part ies — Compensation to members of panel. Upon written 
agreement by all parties, the proceeding may be considered a binding arbitration 
hearing and proceed under Chapter 31, Title 78, except for the selection of the 
panel, which is done as set forth in Section 78-14-12 (4). If the proceeding is consid-
ered an arbitration proceeding, the parties are equally responsible for compensa-
tion to the members of the panel for services rendered. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-16, enacted by | L. 
1985, ch. 238. § 5. 
CHAPTER 15 
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT 
78-15-1. Short title of act. 
Law Reviews. 
The Utah Product Liability Limitation of 
Action: An Unfair Resolution of Competing 
Concerns, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 149. 
Strict Products Liability in Utah Following 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel to., 
1980 Utah L. Rev. 577. 
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entelred 
the Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 
Utah L. Rev. 495, 496. 
78-15-4. P raye r for damages. 
Defense of misuse — comparative princi-
ples in determining liability. 
Where the defense of misuse was present 
in a products liability case, Supreme Court 
applied comparative principles to adopt the 
rule that the defense of misuse in a products 
Some Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons 
in Products Liability Cases, 1981 Utah L. 
Rev. 3. 
The Merger of Comparative Fault Princi-
ples with Strict Liability in Utah: Mulherin 
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 964. 
Used Products and Strict Liability: A Prac-
tical Approach to a Complex Problem, 1981 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 154. 
Mulherin v. Ingersolk Utah Adopts Com-
parative Principles in Strict Products Liabil-
ity Cases, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 461. 
liability case, where both defect in the 
product and misuse contribute to cause the 
damaging event, will limit the plaintiff's 
recovery to that portion of his damages equal 
to the percentage of the cause contributed by 
the product defect. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co. (1981) 628 P 2d 1301. 
78-15-5. Alteration or modification of product , etc. 
Applicability. 
This section did not apply where there was 
no alteration or modification of the product 
which changed its purpose or use from that 
for which it was designed. Mulherin v. 
Ingersoll-Rand Co. (19S1) 628 P 2d 1301. 
This section requires some sort of physical 
alteration or modification of the product 
itself which leaves the product in a different 
condition or form than it was in when it left 
the manufacturer's or seller's hands. 
Beacham v. Lee-Norse (1983) 714 F 2d 1010. 
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